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Abstract
Models that account for the progression of nation–building and the impacts of
the instruments of national power – Diplomacy, Informational, Military, and Eco-
nomic effects – are rare. This research proposes the development of such a model.
Through the derivation of state indices for the operational variables: Political, Mili-
tary, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information, a functional form of a system
of differential equations is developed to account for the interactions between the state
indices and instruments of national power. The developed methodology is a mean–
field inverse problem which solves for the coefficients of the differential equations in
a data driven manner. Publicly–available data is used in the development of the in-
dices and to describe the instruments of national power. Applying mean-field theory
allows the indices to take on a mean value, in order to systemically solve the differen-
tial equations through a nonlinear program which derives minimum error producing
coefficients. These models can then be used for a more in–depth analysis of historical
events.
An application of the model is derived for Operation Iraqi Freedom to demon-
strate the utility as well as effects of various alternate strategies, using the dynamics
captured in the model. This modeling approach offers a potential significant capa-
bility when analyzing and planning for future Stabilization, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations.
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UNDERSTANDING THE INSTRUMENTS OF
NATIONAL POWER THROUGH
A SYSTEM OF DIFFERENTIAL
EQUATIONS IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity
to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially
those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help
them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies,
and market economies. The United States should work with other coun-
tries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever pos-
sible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate
to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market
economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable gov-
ernments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to
prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe
haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who
pose a threat to US foreign policy, security, or economic interests. [10]
– George W. Bush
A key interest of the United States are those states or regions which are in tran-
sition or reconstruction. As stated above the US seeks to aid and assist when needed
in order to prevent states from becoming safe havens for threats. In the short his-
tory of the US there have been several military operations (Operation Urgent Fury –
Grenada, Operation Just Cause – Panama, Operation Desert Storm – Kuwait, Oper-
ation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom – Iraq, etc.) which
have been instances of these type of operations. While the operations vary in size,
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purpose, and intensity they remain examples of how the US employed its military
capability to support its strategic goals.
The range of military support provided in foreign countries across the contin-
uum from peace to conflict in order to assist a state or region that is under severe
stress or has collapsed is called Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruc-
tion operations (SSTRO). These are not unilateral military operations but rather
the synchronous effort of military and civilian, public and private, as well as US and
international efforts to provide assistance to the state or region in need [49:i].
According to the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Re-
construction Operations Joint Operating Concept the definition for these four types
of operations are:
Stabilization- involves activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions, to pre-
vent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems, to
create stability in the host nation or region, and to establish the preconditions
for reconstruction efforts [49:2].
Security- involves the establishment of a safe and secure environment for the local
populace, host nation military and civilian organizations as well as USG and
coalition agencies, which are conducting SSTRO [49:2].
Transition- describes the process of shifting the lead responsibility and authority
for helping provide or foster security, essential services, humanitarian assistance,
economic development, and political governance from the intervening military
and civilian agencies to the host nation. Transitions are event driven and will
occur within the major mission elements (MMEs) at that point when the entity
assuming the lead responsibility has the capability and capacity to carry out
the relevant activities [49:2-3].
Reconstruction- is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed po-
litical, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to
create the foundation for longer-term development [49:3].
The tools available to the US to conduct SSTRO are the instruments of national
power (Diplomacy, Informational, Military, and Economic or DIME). These are the
means through which the US applies its sources of power, to include– culture, industry,
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science and technology, academic institutions, and national will to achieve its national
strategic objectives [17:I-8].
1.2 Problem Statement
With the threat of conflict or diaster striking anywhere in the world at a moments
notice the ability to evaluate how specific packages of DIME assistance might be
implemented and an assessment of their perceived impact would be a tool of great
use in strategic level planning. Currently the Department of Defense (DOD) has tools
to help determine, predict, and classify which states are instable, on a trajectory to
become instable, or susceptible to instability in future years. None of theses tools are
prescriptive in nature nor do they indicate what can be done to increase the level of
stability in these states to reverse the current situation or trajectory [48].
Some assessments of SSTRO during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) indicate
the belief that the economic instrument of DIME was ineffective and perhaps even
counter–productive. The point that leads to this assessment is that the impact of the
economic effort is largely unknown and based upon anecdotal evidence which leads
to the wrong lessons [15]. Even with a large focus on measuring and assessing, the
impacts of the economic aid is largely unknown due to yearly turnover of units. Large
portions of data are erased or destroyed as one unit departs and another arrives, thus
making it difficult to evaluate anything over one year.
This research develops a methodology which considers the interactions of the
nation providing SSTRO and the nation receiving SSTRO as a complex dynamical
system. This system is then solved as in inverse problem with an application of mean–
field theory. A solution methodology is presented and then an application using data
from OIF demonstrates the dynamics captured from the actual data.
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1.3 Research Objective and Scope
As the Nation continues into this era of uncertainty and persistent con-
flict, the lines separating war and peace, enemy and friend, have blurred
and no longer conform to the clear delineations we once knew. At the
same time, emerging drivers of conflict and instability are combining with
rapid cultural, social, and technological change to further complicate our
understanding of the global security environment. Military success alone
will not be sufficient to prevail in this environment. To confront the chal-
lenges before us, we must strengthen the capacity of the other elements of
national power, leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners.
[21:Forward]
LTG William B. Caldwell, IV
Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center
The nature of conflict is increasingly complex and uncertain. LTG Caldwell’s
words underscore both the importance of national power and the necessity to more
clearly understand its effects on and within an uncertain military environment. The
dynamic and potentially unpredictable nature of SSTRO is increasingly evident when
the second and third order effects are considered. This indicates the need for dynamic
models and data that can help make decisions when lives, money, and national security
objectives are in jeopardy [16].
In order to understand the importance and effects of DIME on and within an un-
certain military environment there must be a method to collect, analyze, and interpret
data which provides insight on these instruments.
The objective of this research is to develop a methodology that provides insight
on the application of the instruments of national power. This methodology will make
use of unclassified data so that it may be applied in multiple situations under different
conditions. The methodology is generic enough to apply to any nation yet resilient
to changes in the data structure that are required to conduct multiple assessments.
This methodology entails–
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• collecting and normalizing data to create indices which capture the current
state.
• using numerical techniques to fit curves to the raw data and approximate deriva-
tive functions for the data.
• conjecturing a functional form as a system of differential equations which ac-
counts for interactions between the indices and the impacts of the instruments
of national power.
• formulating a nonlinear program to solve for the coefficients in the system of
differential equations.
• using a numerical method with the results of the system of differential equations
to gain insight on the system.
1.4 Summary
The relevance of this research was provided in this chapter as well as a brief
description of the model methodology implemented in the research. The research
presented here is based on unclassified information retrieved from the Brookings In-
stitution collected during OIF and is representative of other conflicts. The results
and findings will be presented to the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) as well as a
graphical user interface which assists in evaluating various strategies.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows:
• Chapter II reviews the relevant literature that applies to the creation of the
solution methodology.
• Chapter III discusses the development of the model and solution methodology.
• Chapter IV is an application of the model using the data from OIF as a test
case and to demonstrate possible applications of the methodology.
• Chapter V presents a review of the significant insights, identifies topics for future
research efforts, and conclusion.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter examines the specific literature which applies to the creation of the
model and solution methodology. Each area focuses on a specific concept and how that
concept was applied in this methodology. The literature review provides the reader
with the background context and justification of the methodology. Each section
will specifically address the concepts selected in the creation of the methodology. A
detailed description of how the concepts are applied is then addressed in Chapter III.
2.1 Instruments of National Power
The instruments of national power, sometimes referred to as the elements of na-
tional power, or categorized under the acronym DIME, are tools at the disposal of
the US to aid in achieving its national strategic objectives. Through a coordinated
interagency effort the employment of some or all of these instruments is an effective
way for the US to apply its sources of power, to include its culture, industry, and
national will [17:I-8]. All four instruments may be applied or a subset of the four,
they are not necessarily mutually exclusive events. A detailed description of each
DIME instrument–Diplomacy, Informational, Military, and Economic follows.
2.1.1 Diplomacy.
The diplomatic instrument is the primary means employed by the Department of
State (DOS) to engage other states to advance the values, interests, and objectives
of the US. The leaders of the US are responsible for having a clear understanding of
the capabilities and consequences of military action. The threat of force can rein-
force or enable the diplomatic process, however, just as easily that threat can destroy
any progress. Within an area of responsibility (AOR) a combatant commander is
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responsible for integrating the military and diplomatic activities. Typically, the US
ambassador and the corresponding country team are responsible for integrating the
diplomatic-military activities abroad. In some specific instances, when directed by the
President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the combatant commander will employ
military forces as well as the other instruments of national power. In these instances,
the US ambassador and team may complement the combatant commander by pro-
viding assistance with the diplomatic instrument activities that do not involve the
military instrument. In these specific instances, planning should be complementary
and coincidental, displaying a coordinated effort from the combatant commander and
ambassador [17:I-9].
Diplomacy is not limited too but certainly may include actions such as providing
mentors to a fledgling government, providing an interim structure to aid during a
transition period, providing and conducting elections, and to both support and legit-
imize a government in the eyes of other states. Assessing and determining the level
of diplomatic assistance is a complicated task that is often highly debated as well. As
a result, diplomacy will not be included in this research.
2.1.2 Informational.
The informational instrument deals with both the protection of information and
the distribution of information. The US has a free market for ideas, however, this
does not mean that all ideas are distributed freely or shared openly. The US goes
through great lengths to protect restricted information from unauthorized access.
The distribution of information is a calculated step which must be executed exactly.
The widespread distribution of an incorrect message would be disastrous. This leads
to a US policy where the government will provide top-down guidance when it comes
to employing the informational instrument. According to JP 1-0, the uses of the
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informational instrument are “...processes and efforts to understand and engage key
audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advancing na-
tional interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes,
messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national
power.” [17:I-9] A holistic effort is implemented through defense support to public
diplomacy and military diplomacy activities [17:I-9].
The traditional military support to the informational instrument are:
• Information Operations (IO)– military operations which include offensive (at-
tacking the adversary’s information) and defensive (protecting our informa-
tion) [17:I-9].
• Public Affairs (PA)– public information which is directed to both the adver-
sary’s public and to the US public [17:I-9].
• Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DPSD)– measures taken by DOD com-
ponents to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts by the U.S [17:I-9].
The successful execution of the informational instrument requires integration into
military plans and operations; as well as synchronization with all US efforts and
agencies, and multinational partners. The informational instrument is perhaps one
of the most complex instruments to manage because it is so difficult to measure. The
ability to determine the impact or calculate the reception of a message is unknown
and for this reason the informational instrument is not included in this research effort.
2.1.3 Military.
The military instrument is perhaps the most well–known, often used aspect of
DIME. The US military can take on a wide range of operations in order to support
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the US national strategic objectives. In this instance the focus is on SSTRO and re-
lated operations. It is not unusual to see the military instrument used both home and
abroad and that is why the military must strictly adhere to the values, principles, and
standards set forth by the appropriate service organizations. The traditional purpose
of the military is to fight and win the nation’s wars. In the case of SSTRO and some
other operations, the application of the military instrument continues well after the
completion of a war or in some instances without conflict. The wide range of opera-
tions the military can conduct makes it a valuable commodity in the application of
DIME. The military aspect must be integrated into the overall plan and synchronized
with all other efforts [17:I-10]. In this research, the military instrument is defined as
the number of troops on the ground in support of US mission.
2.1.4 Economic.
The economic instrument of national power is supported by the free market econ-
omy of the US. The backbone of this system is the Department of the Treasury,
which is an influential participant in the international economy. As a part of the eco-
nomic instrument of national power, the Department of the Treasury works with other
federal agencies, other nations, and international financial institutions to encourage
economic growth, raise standards of living, and predict and prevent, to the maximum
extent possible, economic and financial crises [17:I-10]. The typical employment of the
economic instrument in SSTRO is through aid packages and assistance to the nations
economy, this is to aid in making a self–supportive nation, when aid is curtailed. In
this research the economic instrument is defined as the amount of economic support
provided to the nation.
9
2.1.5 DIME Summary.
According to doctrine, the application of DIME must always be a concerted effort
executed by all agencies providing support. When executed in this manner the great-
est effects can be realized. As demonstrated above, the DIME instruments are all
actions provided or imposed by the US, in this case, they are exogenous or external
variables to the state (system). In the system to be examined, there will be two
instruments of national power considered, the acronym diME will be used to describe
the military and economic instruments.
2.2 Operational Variables
Joint planning is in terms of six interrelated operational variables (Political, Mil-
itary, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure or PMESII), as shown in
Figure 1 [20:1-5].
Figure 1. The Interconnected Operational Environment [18]
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These variables encompass the broadest aspects of both the military and nonmil-
itary environment and will differ for each operation as well as different AORs within
the same operation. The PMESII variables describe the military aspects of the op-
erational environment as well as the influence of the population on the operational
environment. As a result, they provide a view which emphasizes the human aspects of
the operational environment. As the US becomes involved in more operations (with
non-contiguous battlefields), understanding the human variables is crucial because
the US forces live and operate amongst the population. A thorough understanding
of PMESII helps combatant commanders to appreciate how the military instrument
complements the other instruments of national power [20:1-5]. A description of the
operational variable components used in this model are provided in Chapter III.
2.2.1 Political.
The political variable is a description of the distribution of responsibility and
power across all levels of government. Whether the political structure has a strong de-
gree of legitimacy with the population and international organizations it can strongly
influence events. The political leaders will often use ideas, beliefs, and even violence
to enhance their power and control over people and resources. There may be con-
flicting political groups and each may interact with the US or multinational force
differently. Understanding the unique circumstances that motivate and drive these
groups requires an understanding of all the relevant partnerships– political, economic,
military, religious, and cultural [20:1-5,6].
2.2.2 Military.
The military variable describes the military capability of all armed forces in a
specific operational environment. The armed forces of a state may include the role of
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providing both internal and external security. Additionally, influencing the military
variable are paramilitary and guerilla forces, as well as the armed forces of neighboring
or ally states. The organization’s ability to field capabilities and use them locally,
regionally, or globally is one way of assessing the military variable. These capabilities
include: 1) Equipment, 2) Manpower, 3) Doctrine, 4) Training levels, 5) Resource
constraints, 6) Leadership, 7) Organizational culture, 8) History, 9) and Nature of
civil-military relations [20:1-6].
2.2.3 Economic.
The economic variable deals with the behaviors of individuals and groups pertain-
ing to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. The influence of
industry, trade, development, finance, policies, capabilities, and legal constraints will
play a significant part in the behaviors associated with economics. While a global
economy is often described, the truth is economies differ by region and maybe af-
fected by things such as the political environment. Factors associated with changes
in the economic environment may include investments, price fluctuation, debt, and
the existence of black markets. A deep understanding of the cost/benefit relationship
in the political–economic realm leads to a better understanding of the interactions of
the different groups within a state [20:1-6,7].
2.2.4 Social.
The society within a operational environment is the social variable. A society
is “a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy
a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity” [20:1-
7]. Societies include diverse structures that may only be observed by a member of
that society or state. Cultures are composed of shared beliefs, values, customs, and
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behaviors that are used by society members to cope with one another and other
societies. As with many things the attributes of a society may change over time,
leading to a split within a society. The societies actions, opinions, or influences
should be considered within the social environment, as they can have an effect on the
mission [20:1-7].
Combatant commanders must develop an understanding of the social aspects
within their AOR, as it allows for an understanding of the impact of operations
and interactions with local leaders. Cultural disasters can often be avoided through
understanding and cultural awareness [20:1-7].
2.2.5 Information.
The information variable describes the information environment, which is the net-
work of people, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act
on information. The information passed along this medium is often rapidly available
and can be used by the US to shape the environment, used by an adversary to control
and manipulate perception and understanding, and will be used to form opinions and
make decisions. Not all states have a complex telecommunications network to share
information, but nonetheless the information will be shared through less sophisti-
cated methods [20:1-8]. Due to the complex nature and difficulty in measuring the
effectiveness of information, it will not be considered it in this research.
2.2.6 Infrastructure.
The infrastructure variable describes the basic facilities, services, and installations
required for a society to function. This also includes technological advances and
development which can be applied to both civil and military purposes. All aspects
of the environment must be considered when improving the infrastructure, certain
13
actions can be perceived as favoring one group over another or may even offend some
of the cultural ideologies of one group. Information operations are an important
aspect of the infrastructure variable [20:1-8].
2.2.7 PMESII Summary.
Each operational environment is different and constantly evolving over time, the
PMESII variables are used to help understand this complex adaptive environment.
Through the PMESII variables, focus can be placed on specific elements within
the operational environment which apply to the mission [20:1-5]. These operational
variables are measures representing the internal or endogenous variables within the
state (system). This research will use five of the six variables (excluding information)
and refer to this set as PMESI.
2.3 Inverse Problems
The goal in solving several types of problems is to determine the set of parameters
which describe the system and the laws relating the values of the parameters to the
results of measurements. When some information is known about the values of the
measurements, a theoretical relationship can be used to infer information on the
values of the parameters. When the problem is posed in this manner, it is called
an inverse problem. In inverse problems, the data are results of the measurements
and the unknowns are the values of the parameters [52]. Partial information is given
or known about a state function, x(t) and the goal is to infer something about the
laws governing state evolution, values of constant parameters, values of exogenous
functions which characterize the system, or values of boundary conditions at certain
points in time [24].
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Tarantola and Valette propose that all problems, inverse or not, in order to be
stated as well-posed problems are formulated as follows:
1. We have a certain state of information available on the values of the data set [52].
2. We also have a certain state of information on the values of the unknowns [52].
3. We have a certain state of information concerning the theoretical relationship
that exists between the data and the unknowns [52].
4. Which is the final state of information on the values of the unknowns resulting
from the combination of the three preceding states [52]?
Many experiments contain a finite amount of data in which can reconstruct a
model with infinitely many degrees of freedom. The result is an inverse problem which
is not unique in that there are many models that can explain the data. According
to Tarantola and Valette, inversion really consists of two steps, from the traditional
inverse problem there is the true model (m) and data (d). From the data, d an
estimated model (m̂) is constructed, this is an estimation problem. Additionally,
the relationship between the estimated model, m̂ and the true model, m must be
investigated. This is called the appraisal problem [50]. The notion of this division
of problems is demonstrated in Figure 2. The estimation problem is typically solved
Figure 2. A problem divided into a forward problem, estimation problem, and appraisal
problem for finite data sets, adapted from [50:389]
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by fitting the model to the data, by letting the ith data element di be related to the
model m through the following relation
di = Gi(m) (2.1)
where Gi(m) is a nonlinear function and Gi(m) 7→ di. The data fitting can be
accomplished by minimizing the difference between the real data, di and estimated
data Gi(m̂) through a least-squares fit
S(m̂) =
∑
i
(di −Gi(m̂))2 (2.2)
as a function of the estimated model m̂[50].
The use of inverse problems in this research is to infer information about the
dynamics of the system through a priori knowledge of the exogenous system variables,
much like Lanchester equations in Section 2.4.
2.4 Lanchester Equations
Within military applications, one of the most famous treatments of inverse prob-
lems are the Lanchester equation solutions, published in F. W. Lanchester’s Aircraft
in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm in 1916. While much of the focus of
Lanchester’s book centers on aircraft and their emerging use in World War I, his ma-
jor contribution was to offer a set of differential equations to model combat power for
both enemy (x) and ally (y) strength, by using existing data. Beginning with aerial
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combat he developed the Linear Law
dx
dt
= −Axy (2.3)
dy
dt
= −Byx
where attrition is proportional to the attrition coefficients (A,B) and the size of both
forces (x, y). This is associated with area fire such as indirect fire. To deal with direct
or aimed fire, he develop the Square Law
dx
dt
= −Ay (2.4)
dy
dt
= −Bx
where attrition is proportional to the strength (x, y) and effectiveness (A,B) [30].
Later he broadened his equations to apply in other types of conflicts. As an inverse
problem, the coefficients are determined through knowledge of the data at time t. His
work continues to serve as the basis and motivation for much research, to include this
research.
Over time, several researchers have used Lanchester equations on prominent bat-
tles as the data became available. In addition to using new data, they also applied
the equations to different types of conflicts, evaluated several different parameters,
and different methods to solve the parameters. Bracken generalized Lanchester equa-
tions to model the Ardennes campaign in World War II, where he considered the
performance of either opposing force at a point in time, with tactical parameters and
attrition rates. Bracken solved for these parameters by implementing a brute–force
method through a constrained grid search [9]. Extending Bracken’s work, Fricker
examined the same Ardennes campaign, but used a linear regression technique [22].
Clemens analyzed the same data set utilizing a nonlinear fit with the Newton-Rhapson
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algorithm [14]. Helmbold makes use of the Newton-Rhapson algorithm while exam-
ining the square law with scheduled reinforcements, as a direct problem and as an
inverse problem [24]. Lucas and Turkes applied a response surface methodology to
the Ardennes data set and solved for the parameters by regression through the origin.
This method allowed them to use a contour plot and visually assess the optimal point
for the parameters. Lucas and Turkes also advanced the idea of using R2 (Equa-
tion 3.9) when using linear regression to compare models using weighted data [31].
Previous methods had primarily focused on the sum of squared residuals or sum of
squared errors (SSE).
The conjugate gradient method is used by Chen to determine the coefficients for
time dependent attrition in the nonlinear Lanchester square law inverse problem
dx1(t)
dt
=−D(t;x1, x2)x2(t) +
dR1(t)
dt
, t > 0;x1(0) = x1,0 (2.5)
dx2(t)
dt
=− A(t;x1, x2)x1(t) +
dR2(t)
dt
, t > 0;x2(0) = x2,0 (2.6)
where
A,D are force dependent attrition coefficients
R is the total reinforcement
x1, x2 are the estimated force strengths
by making use of the observed force strength data. In order to numerically solve these
equations the fourth–order Runge–Kutta method was used. Chen found this method
to be advantageous because there was no prior knowledge required to solve for the
unknown parameters. This method allows for an arbitrary guess as an initial starting
point [13].
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The application of Lanchester Equations has been documented in other areas as
well, such as irregular warfare. Schaffer, for example, used Lanchester Equations to
model guerilla warfare and asymmetric engagements while employing and operational-
izing an array of variables and coefficients (representing weapons strength, discipline,
morale, etc.) to model an insurgent force in Phase II of an insurgency [47]. Richard-
son used a system of differential equations to model the arms race and instability
of nation states based upon the current levels of its neighboring and/or menacing
states [43]. Lanchester Equations and the types of models derived from them show
the application of the inverse problem in many different fields.
2.5 Mean–Field Theory
Many problems involve a large number of independent variables where the exact
calculation of such a problem is infeasible. In order to solve these problems, efficient
approximation techniques are needed in order to better understand their dynamics.
The method of using a Mean–Field Equation (MFE) to approximate these dynamics
is an efficient approximation method to aid in solving problems dealing with uncer-
tainty and complexity [40:ix,1].
In this method, the values of the variables to be examined are replaced with the
MFE. The variables of the dynamical system are used to determine some mean value;
this is accomplished through an equation that provides the mean–field simplification.
This allows the focus to be placed on one variable at a time by effectively holding
the others constant. To think of this intuitively, envision a problem with multiple
variables and only one is not represented by its mean value. This leaves the one free
variable independent of the others, thus creating the ability to calculate the value
of the free variable. The process is then repeated in the same fashion over all of
the remaining values. Persson, Claesson, and Nordebo use this technique to conduct
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discrete adaptive filtering using a mean–field algorithm to minimize the Wienr-Hopf
equations in a least–squares sense to produce comparable results without transient
behavior and facilitate abrupt system changes [41].
The mean–field equations can be the mean value or an approximated probability
distribution to represent the unknown variables. With a large number of variables
that exhibit nonlinear behaviors fitting them with a nonlinear least–squares model
is an effective method [41]. This concept was shown using an epidemic model based
upon a system of differential equations by Kleczkowski and Grenfell [28].
This method injects a portion of generality into the process which still accounts
for the noise in the system, yet simplifies the problem by using a constant in the place
of an ever–changing variable. This method replaces some of the stochastic elements
with deterministic elements, the result is stochastic system represented through its
deterministic equivalent.
This method is not without error, as the number of estimated variables reduces
the overall confidence level of the result by one degree of freedom each time. This does
not indicate inaccuracy, but rather that the end result will be an overall estimation
of the system based upon the previous interactions. It may downplay the effect of
outliers in the generalization, but it does account for them. The error in the system
is expected to be normally distributed. This is important to the least–squares fitting
aspect and the independence of the variables in the system.
This method replaces an infinite dimension system with several dependent vari-
ables, with a series of independent variables in a finite dimension system, thus reduc-
ing the overall complexity of the problem and allowing us to understand the dynamics
of complex problems.
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2.6 Dynamical Systems
When creating models, a real world system to study is identified, all the aspects of
that system are studied, and assumptions are made when and where they are needed.
After studying the system, it is often translated into a mathematical relationship
which can be modeled. A knowledge of mathematics is used to conduct analysis on
this system, in hopes that the complicated interrelationships that exist in the real
world system can be solved; then translate the knowledge gained from the model
back to the real world system. Dynamical modeling is the science of modeling real
world phenomena as it changes over time [46:3].
According to Boccara and Meiss, the definition of a dynamical system is a set or
system of equations whose solution describes the evolution or trajectory, as a function
of a parameter (time) along a set of states (phase space) of the system [33:105-
106] [7:11]. The theory behind dynamical systems is primarily concerned with the
qualitative properties of the system dynamics and gaining an understanding of the
asymptotic properties, as t→∞.
A typical dynamical system is comprised of a phase space, S, whose elements
represent all possible states for the system; a time parameter, t, which may be discrete
or continuous; and an evolution rule (a rule that governs the transition of states from
ti to ti+1 based upon knowledge of the states at prior times) [7:105-106]. A dynamical
system is characterized according to these three elements. Systems with both discrete
time space and time variables are often considered mappings. When the evolution
rule is deterministic then for each time, t, it is a mapping from phase space to phase
space
ϕt : S → S (2.7)
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so that x(t) = ϕt(x0) indicates the state of the system at time t that begins at x0.
The value of t is assumed to only take on values in some allowed range, the set of
nonnegative real numbers R+ and the initial value of t = 0⇒ ϕ0(x0) = x0 [33:106].
Dynamical systems can be modeled by a finite number of coupled first-order or-
dinary differential equations
ẋ1 = f1(t;x1, . . . , xn;u1, . . . , up)
ẋ2 = f2(t;x1, . . . , xn;u1, . . . , up)
...
ẋn = fn(t;x1, . . . , xn;u1, . . . , up) (2.8)
where ẋi is the derivative of xi with respect to time, t, and the set of variables
u1, u2, . . . , up are control variables required for that system. The variables x1, x2, . . . , xn
are the state variables and represent the memory the dynamical system has of its past.
In order to write these systems in compact form, vector notation is generally used.
First, the vectors are defined as
x =

x1
x2
...
xn

, u =

u1
u2
...
up

, f(t, x, u) =

f1(t, x, u)
f2(t, x, u)
...
fn(t, x, u)

(2.9)
and then rewritten as a compact first-order vector differential equation
ẋ = f(t, x, u) (2.10)
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This is the state equation where x is the state and u is the control. Sometimes another
equation
y = h(t, x, u) (2.11)
defines an output vector comprised of variables of particular interest in the analysis
of the system. The two together form the state space model or state model. Math
models of finite dimensional systems do not always come in the form of a state model.
However, physical systems can thoroughly be modeled in this form by carefully se-
lecting the state variables [27:1-4].
While nonlinear systems are often more accurate models of real world systems
than linear models, many of the linear models are actually linearizations of nonlinear
models because it is often difficult to find a closed form solution of a nonlinear system.
By using the appropriate techniques it is possible to determine qualitative behaviors
of the solutions of a nonlinear system which is desired [46:367].
2.7 Nonlinear Programming
In data fitting, the goal is to find a model which best fits some observed data
and prior information from a selection of potential models. The variables are the
parameters of these models, and the constraints represent the prior knowledge or
limits of the system. The objective function may be the measure of error between
the observations and the predicted values from the model. The optimization problem
is to find the vector of model parameters which minimizes the objective function
and is consistent with prior information. When the optimization problem contains
a nonlinear objective function or constraints and is not known to be convex, it is a
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nonlinear programming problem [8:9-11]. A typical nonlinear program is of the form:
Minimize f(x)
subject to gi(x) ≤ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m
hi(x) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , ` (2.12)
x ∈ X
where f g1, . . . , gm, h1, . . . , h` are functions defined on Rn, X ⊂ Rn, and x is a vector
of n components x1,. . . ,xn. The problem is solved for the variables x1,. . . ,xn that
satisfy the constraints and minimizes the function f(x) [3:1-2].
Many nonlinear problems are extremely challenging, even ones that appear sim-
ple, may be unyielding. The field of nonlinear programming is filled with different
approaches for specific problems, and even compromises in some instances. One
common method of solving nonlinear programs, which is implemented in many com-
mercial solver engines, is the generalized reduced gradient (GRG) method. This
method uses a discrete sequence of positive step sizes and sequentially attempts to
determine a corresponding xk+1 for each step size using a Newton-Raphson scheme.
Then using the value of f(xk+1) at that point, a quadratic interpolation method is
conducted, when the three–point pattern (TPP) is obtained then a quadratic fit is
used to provide the next step size. The process is conducted until a feasible vector
which yields the minimum objective function is found [3:612-613].
The GRG method is implemented in the EXCEL solver engine, and is used to
solve the nonlinear program which calculates the coefficient values for the system of
differential equations in this methodology.
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2.8 Prior Related Research Efforts
Over the past decade, there have been several efforts which researched different
aspects of SSTRO. The range of topics cover systems dynamics models, social net-
work models, goal programming, optimization models, and classification models; each
work contributing to the field of SSTRO research.
2.8.1 Modeling Efforts.
One attempt to model the dynamics involved in reconstruction operations was
using systems dynamics modeling techniques to simulate the establishment of public
order and safety by Richardson. The purpose was to help decision makers by providing
insight regarding the possible policy alternatives presented to them. The main idea
is to take complex problems and break them down into manageable subproblems,
then aggregate assumptions about the simpler questions to estimate answers for the
larger complex problem. This was demonstrated in a notional example at a national
level [42].
Robbins then advanced the model by instituting a sub-national, regional level ap-
proach. This allowed the user to concentrate on potentially troublesome regions, by
providing information specific to the dynamics within that AOR. The results help the
user understand the significance of the dynamic relationship of forces involved during
SSTRO and potentially gain insight to the successful completion of the SSTRO mis-
sion [44]. This model eventually was re-engineered by Air Force Research Laboratory–
Rome Laboratory (AFRL-RL) and become the National Operational Environment
Model (NOEM) currently maintained by the same organization.
A social network analysis study was conducted by Bernardoni using Ronald Burt’s
structural hole technique to facilitate nation–building in failing and failed states.
Bernardoni applied Burt’s technique at a national level to identify the structural gaps
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within a failing state by focusing on techniques that link professional and government
community individuals [4].
2.8.2 Optimization Models.
The application of goal programming was conducted by Bang to formulate the
Coalition Operation Planning Model which was based upon three different sub-
models: the Coalition Mission-Unit Allocation Model (Shortest Path), the Coalition
Mission-Support Model (Network Flow), and the Coalition Mission-Unit Grouping
Model (Quadratic Assignment). This method was applied to notional humanitarian
assistance scenario and showed that many of the decisions were directly influenced
by the political nature of the coalition and the framework provided by the political
situation [2].
A goal programming project scheduling approach was conducted by Chaney to
prioritize and schedule activities to maximize the impacts in SSTRO. This was es-
tablished through three goals: 1) restore essential services in a timely manner, 2) dis-
tribute employment equally throughout the state, and 3) meet standards for sustain-
able income in each region. This was applied in a notional scenario, and showed how
to schedule activities to meet the three goals while still meeting the intent of the ini-
tial response. Chaney presented three main points in this work: 1) consider economic
impacts of reconstruction activities, 2) quantitative project scheduling techniques can
be applied to SSTRO, and 3) the establish of these techniques adds defensibility to
the plan and can uncover potential shortfalls [12].
2.8.3 Classification Models.
With the number of failing or failed states on the rise, the ability to determine
the indicators which lead to a failed state and identify states which are failing is a
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desirable feature. Nysether used factor analysis to identify the indicators and then
apply discriminant analysis using the identified factors to classify states as stable,
borderline, or failing. This was applied using open source data for 200 countries with
167 variables. This research is useful in identifying states which may require future
SSTRO [38].
Understanding the factors which lead to war termination was researched by Robin-
son through the use of binary and multinomial logistic regression techniques. Robin-
son found that duration of conflict was the most relevant factor in predicting the
winner of conflict and total casualties was the most relevant factor in predicting the
manner in which an interstate war ends. This was examined in analysis of 19th and
20th century data [45].
Using the same methods as Nysether and Robinson as well as Canonical Corre-
lation and Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Tannehill develop a mathematical
model to forecast instability indicators in the Horn of Africa region using 54 vari-
ables over 32 years of observations. This model used indicators such as battle deaths,
refugees, genocide deaths, and undernourishment to forecast instability. Tannehill
found that a four–year forecast was possible while maintaining or improving the fore-
cast error rate. This demonstrated the feasibility of longer term predictive models
which would allow policy makers more time to develop plans [51].
In 2007, CAA initiated the Forecast and Analysis of Complex Threats (FACT)
study. This study looked at predicting the potential for future conflict in select
nation–states. The study found 13 features to measure and scaled the features on
a [0, 1] scale using the Euclidian distance. A PCA was conducted in an attempt to
reduce the dimensionality of the data. The components then provided a proxy for
similarity between states. A forecast was then generated using a Weighted Moving
Average (WMA) and used both the k-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and Nearest Centroid
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(a) Coalition and Regional (b) Indigenous
Figure 3. RAND Study Models[32:98,115]
(NC) algorithms to classify future features. The study found that KNN performed
better than NC with 85% or greater accuracy in all test cases. The methodology
was adopted for use under the premise that it is predictive rather then prescriptive
as discussed in Section 1.2 [48].
The RAND Arroyo Center conducted a study looking at the strategic elements
to build partner capacity for stability operations in nations around the globe. The
study focused on the elements which would align the security cooperation efforts of
the US and building partner capacity. As part of this study they created two models;
the Coalition and Regional model and the Indigenous model, shown in Figure 3.
The Coalition and Regional model was used to assess the capability of nations to
be partners in stability operations: 28 countries fell into the high capability category,
5 of which were considered preferred. The study concluded that the high capability
countries are unwilling to participate and/or are inappropriate for such operations.
The preferred countries were Argentina, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and South
Africa [32:111].
The Indigenous model assessed how fragile a state was and the threat posed if
they deteriorated or collapsed. The study found that this model also listed 28 of the
31 countries listed in the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index. Out of the 28, 16
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were candidates based upon the US having two or more strategic interests with that
country. The 16 are Afghanistan, Columbia, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates,
and Venezuela. Several of these nations are receiving aid already or are considered
ineligible because of the current government in place [32:122-123].
The study concluded that it would be beneficial for the US to develop a selective
strategy for partnership that nests with the security of the nation and the national
military strategy [32:123-124].
2.8.4 Systems of Differential Equations Models.
A dynamic model of insurgency was created using Lanchester equations and Iraq
war data by Blank et al. The model proposed a system of differential equations
dI
dt
=(ri − γc)C
dC
dt
=(rc − γi)I (2.13)
where
I is the number of insurgent attacks on the coalition
C is size of the coalition
ri is the recruitment rate of the insurgents
rc is the recruitment rate of the coalition
γi is the combat effectiveness coefficient of the insurgents
γc is the combat effectiveness coefficient of the coalition
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The general solution to the system of differential equations is then used to plot the
phase portraits of the system and deduce information based upon four cases: 1) the
coalition increases in size and the number of attacks by the insurgents increases, 2) the
size of the coalition decreases and the number of attacks by insurgents decreases,
3) the coalition increases and the number of insurgent attacks decreases, and 4) the
coalition decreases and the number of insurgent attacks increases [6].
The relevance of the case is dependent upon the net recruitment rates (ri − γc)
and (rc − γi) of the coalition and insurgents as well as the combat effectiveness of
both sides. Using these plots the case where there is no coalition presence and the
insurgent attacks are zero, the system is unstable, implying there is no amenable
solution that leads to stability [6].
A nation–building model investigating the assimilation of different ethnicities into
a single nation was developed by Yamamoto. This model was derived from the system
of differential equations in the Deutsch Model for Nation–Formation by Karl Deutsch.
Yamamoto derived two models and applied them to the Philippines [54].
The Modernism model is predicated upon the belief that a single underlying popu-
lation (U) will mobilize into two different groups, assimilated (N) and differentiated(H).
The Modernism model is formulated as
dN
dt
= gN + αmU
dH
dt
= gH + (1− α)mU
dU
dt
= gU −mU (2.14)
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where
g is the natural population increase rate
m is the mobilization rate
α is the rate of integrating into the assimilated group (N)
α,m ∈ (0, 1]
The Historicism model is predicated upon the belief that underlying population
(U) is composed of two groups (Q,R) which will mobilize into the assimilated (Q 7→
N) and differentiated (R 7→ H). The Historicism model is formulated as
dN
dt
= gN + αmQ
dH
dt
= gH + (1− α)mR
dQ
dt
= gQ− αmQ
dR
dt
= gR− (1− α)mR (2.15)
where
g is the natural population increase rate
m is the mobilization rate
α is the rate of integrating into the assimilated group (N)
α,m ∈ (0, 1]
These models investigate the effectiveness of the integration policies implemented
by the Philippine government. The results suggest that the integration policy which
involves the creation of an environment where multiple cultural groups can coexist
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is the most successful. Assimilating two groups into one culture in the Modernism
model was unsuccessful [54].
A population model developed by Johnson and Madin was based upon the Logistic
differential equation. This model makes use of population size (N), recruitment (r),
carrying capacity (K), and mortality (m) to investigate the dynamics in the insurgent
population. The discrete time logistic model takes on the following form
∆N = r
(
1− N
K
)
N
Nt+1 = Nt+ r
(
1− Nt
K
)
Nt −mt (2.16)
The model is applied to counterinsurgencies in Malaya (1948-1960) and Iraq (2003-
2006) making use of data from United Kingdom Royal Air Force records and the
Brookings Institution respectively. Given the available data, a least–squares opti-
mization was implemented to estimate the unknown parameters (K, r), which are
assumed to remain constant through the time period. After fitting the parameters,
future trajectories were calculated using Equation 2.16. The results in the Iraq model
suggested that 1) if sectarian violence had remained at low levels (such as 2006), the
insurgency would have collapsed in 4-5 years based upon the US maintaining the
trend of improving military performance, 2) moderate changes to the combination of
K, r, or m may have led to the defeat of the insurgency in 6-12 months. Johnson
and Madin suggest that increase in sectarian violence was the reason that the second
case did not take place [25].
2.9 Summary
In this chapter, a review of relevant background literature was presented to the
reader which provides context for the construction of the model and the solution
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methodology. The literature provided the theory and concepts which are behind the
model and the solution methodology. In addition, a review of related SSTRO research
efforts and systems of differential equations modeling was presented. Chapter III will
describe the application of these concepts to the model and solution methodology.
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III. Methodology
This research develops a solution methodology to solve the inverse problem with
the following three steps:
1. Data collection and index formation.
2. Curve fitting and calculating derivatives.
3. Determining the coefficients of the system of differential equations.
The results of step 3 provide a means to conduct analysis on the system and gather
insight on the dynamics of the relationship between the diME and PMESI in Chap-
ter IV. The steps are graphically depicted in Figure 4 and described in the next three
sections.
Figure 4. Solution Methodology
3.1 Data Collection and Index formation
The PMESI indices are composite indices; they represent a mathematical trans-
formation (and aggregation) of different relevant indicators into one value. The use
of such indicators to reflect country performance is widely practiced. A recent survey
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by Bandura details over 170 different composite country performance measurements
used in practice [1]. The Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators, published
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operations and Development, notes composite
indices:
• Can summarize complex, multi-dimensional realities for decisions makers [37:13].
• Are understood more easily than a list of their subcomponents and they reduce
the set of indicators without dispensing underlying information [37:13].
• Can assess progress of countries over time [37:13].
• Enable comparisons of complex dimensions effectively [37:13].
Nardo et al warns that the justification and construction of composite indices lies
in their fitness to the intended purpose and the acceptance of peers [37:14]. Follow-
ing this concept, the composite indices are built following the PMESI operational
variables outlined in the Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations. They are described
abstractly in Section 2.2 and specifically in the next six sections.
3.1.1 Index construct.
The set of operational variables in the system is defined by X = {P,M,E, S, I}.
Without loss of generality, each X can be described by the set of indicators, X
(j)
t ,
where j indicates the enumeration of the indicators 1, 2, . . . , n and each indicator is
a set of monthly observations, t given by:
X
(1)
t =
{
x
(1)
1 , x
(1)
2 , . . . , x
(1)
70
}
X
(2)
t =
{
x
(2)
1 , x
(2)
2 , . . . , x
(2)
70
}
...
X
(n)
t =
{
x
(n)
1 , x
(n)
2 , . . . , x
(n)
70
}
(3.1)
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where
n = the total number of indicators in X
t = 1, 2, . . . , 70
Each indicator, x
(j)
t ∈ X will measure the same operational environment. However,
some indicators in X will have observations with dissimilar units and frequency, and
some will have missing data. Scale differences are compensated for by defining a com-
mon timeline for each indicator representing the overall time period 1, 2, . . . , t. Indi-
cators with yearly data or missing monthly data are adjusted and gaps filled through
linear interpolation. With a common observation frequency, the resulting data for
each indicator is then normalized across the same [0, 1] range, so that each observa-
tion has a common score scale. Using benchmarks within each indicator (maximum
and minimum observations for the time period), the observations are normalized as
follows:
Norm
(
x
(j)
t
)
=

(
x
(j)
t −max
(
x
(j)
t
))
(
max
(
x
(j)
t
)
−min
(
x
(j)
t
)) where max(x(j)t ) is the best possible score
1−
(
x
(j)
t −max
(
x
(j)
t
))
(
max
(
x
(j)
t
)
−min
(
x
(j)
t
)) where min(x(j)t ) is the best possible score
(3.2)
Next, a weight, w, is assigned to each indicator representative of its perceived im-
portance to the overall composition. Finally, the weight indicators are aggregated to
achieve a composite index for each time step, t. For example, the final composite of
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the 1st index is described by:
X
(1)
t =
n∑
j=1
(wj)
(
Norm
(
x
(1)
t
))
(3.3)
where X
(1)
t is the first composite index at time t.
The data used to create the indices are retrieved from the following open source
data sets:
• The Brookings Institution (last accessed 06 December 2011)
(www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq-index.aspx)
• The CIA Factbook (last accessed 06 December 2011)
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html)
• The United States Department of State (last accessed 06 December 2011)
(http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/)
• The United States Department of Defense (last accessed 06 December 2011)
(http://www.defense.gov/home/features/iraq reports/index.html)
The data used in this research is from sources considered credible and is readily
available. A perfect model with unobservable data can only provide theoretical as-
pects at best, a good model with good data provides insight. Much of the literature
reviewed concerning the Iraq war makes use of the same sources. In this research,
exclusive use is made of data that is already collected or is continually collected.
The next five sections will describe each of the five PMESI indices and the two
forcing functions in detail.
3.1.2 Political Index.
From the description in Section 2.2.1, the political variable is summarized as
describing the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance.
The political variable, Pt, references the Political Index value at time t. The Political
Index is made up of six data points:
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Size of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) on Duty – The total number of ISF on duty
during a given month, this includes the Iraqi Police forces, Iraqi National Guard
forces, Iraqi Border Patrol, and the Iraqi Armed Forces.
How confident are the Iraqi people in the Iraqi Army? – The percentage of
Iraqi people that are confident in the ability of the Iraqi Army.
How confident are the Iraqi people in the Iraqi Police? – The percentage of
Iraqi people that are confident in the ability of the Iraqi Police.
Elected Government Constant – A subjective score [0,0.5,1] based upon the cur-
rent level of elected government officials.
Displaced Persons metric – The number of internally displaced persons per month.
Freedom of Press Index – The Reporters Without Borders Annual Freedom of
Press Index extrapolated monthly.
The Political Index is decomposed in figure 5. The first three data points are aggre-
Figure 5. Decomposition of the Political Variable
gated into a composite security index which is then scaled by the Iraqi population
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and normalized on a [0,1] scale by the following expression
min
(
(ISFN)
(
Poll1+Poll2
2
)
Population(100k)
, 1
)
(3.4)
where
ISFN = Size of Iraqi Security Forces
Poll1 = Iraqi Army Confidence poll
Poll2 = Iraqi Police Confidence poll
The remaining three data points (Elected Government Constant, Displaced Persons
Metric, and Freedom of Press Index) are then normalized by Equation 3.2 and the
final composite index of Pt is calculated according to Equation 3.3.
3.1.3 Military Index.
From the description in Section 2.2.2, the military variable is summarized as the
military capability of the armed forces in the operational environment. The military
variable, Mt, references the Military Index value at time t. The Military Index is
made up of five data points:
Number of ISF Killed in Action (KIA) – The total number of ISF that were
KIA during a given month, this includes the Iraqi Police forces, Iraqi National
Guard forces, Iraqi Border Patrol, and the Iraqi Armed Forces.
Number of Coalition Fatalities – The total number of coalition troops KIA dur-
ing a given month, the number of coalition countries and forces may change
throughout the war.
Number of Attacks on Iraqi Oil and Gas Infrastructure and Personnel – The
number of attacks on oil and gas infrastructure and personnel during a given
month.
Number of Iraqi Civilian Fatalities – The total number of Iraqi civilians KIA
during a given month by acts of war or other violent means.
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Multiple Fatality Car/Suicide Bombings – The number multiple fatality at-
tacks carried out by car or suicide type bombings for a given month.
The Military Index is decomposed in Figure 6. The five data points are then nor-
Figure 6. Decomposition of the Military Variable
malized by Equation 3.2 and the final composite index of Mt is calculated according
to Equation 3.3.
3.1.4 Economic Index.
From the description in Section 2.2.3, the economic variable is summarized as
the aspects which encompass individual and group behaviors related to producing,
distributing, and consuming resources. The economic variable, Et, references the
Economic Index value at time t. The Economic Index is made up of four data points:
Nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – The annual GDP for Iraq in terms
of US dollars (billions), extrapolated monthly.
Consumer Price Index (CPI) Percent Change – The percent change of the CPI
from year to year, extrapolated monthly.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) – The amount of monthly FDI attracted in
millions of US dollars.
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Oil Revenue – The amount of monthly revenue generated from oil production and
distribution monthly in billions of US dollars.
The Economic Index is decomposed in Figure 7. The four data points are then
Figure 7. Decomposition of the Economic Variable
normalized by Equation 3.2 and the final composite index of Et is calculated according
to Equation 3.3.
3.1.5 Social Index.
From the description in Section 2.2.4, the social variable is summarized as the
aspects that describe the societal groups and the factors influencing daily life within
the operational environment and within the groups. The social variable, St, references
the Social Index value at time t. The Social Index is made up of six data points:
Iraqi satisfaction level with the availability of clean water – Annual polling
data regarding the percentage of Iraqi people satisfied with the current avail-
ability of clean water, extrapolated monthly.
Iraqi satisfaction level with the availability of medical care – Annual polling
data regarding the percentage of Iraqi people satisfied with the current avail-
ability of medical care, extrapolated monthly.
Iraqi satisfaction level with the availability of fuel – Annual polling data re-
garding the percentage of Iraqi people satisfied with the current availability of
fuel, extrapolated monthly.
Number of Doctors – The number of trained doctors in Iraqi for a given month.
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Number of Trained Judges – The number of trained judges within Iraq for a
given month.
Number of School-Age Children – The number of school-age children (primary
and secondary schools) in billions for a given month.
The Social Index is decomposed in Figure 8. The first three data points are
Figure 8. Decomposition of the Social Variable
aggregated into an overall availability of services index and normalized on a [0,1]
scale by the following expression
1
3
3∑
j=1
Svcj (3.5)
where
Svcj = The score for poll j
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The remaining three data points (Number of Doctors, Number of Trained Judges,
and Number of School-Age Children) are then normalized by Equation 3.2 and the
final composite index of Pt is calculated according to Equation 3.3.
3.1.6 Infrastructure Index.
From the description in Section 2.2.6, the infrastructure variable is summarized
as the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for a society to function. The
infrastructure variable, It, references the Infrastructure Index value at time t. The
Infrastructure Index is made up of three data points:
Number of Telephone Subscribers – The monthly number of Iraqi people who
subscribe to telephone service, both cellular and land–line service.
Average Daily Hours of Electricity – The average hours of daily electricity ser-
vice provided to the country of Iraq for a given month.
Number of Internet Subscribers – The monthly number of Iraqi people who sub-
scribe to internet service.
The Economic Index is decomposed in Figure 9. The three data points are then
Figure 9. Decomposition of the Infrastructure Variable
normalized by Equation 3.2 and the final composite index of It is calculated according
to Equation 3.3.
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3.1.7 Military Forcing Function.
The military forcing function is another exogenous control variable to the system.
In accordance with Section 2.1.3, the variable Milt indicates the total number of US
armed forces with boots on the ground or BOG in Iraq during month t. The value
of Milt can assume a real number value greater than 0 and is described in terms of
100,000 troops.
3.1.8 Economic Forcing Function.
The economic forcing function is the final exogenous control variable in this sys-
tem. In accordance with Section 2.1.4, the variable Ecot indicates the total amount
of US monetary aid in billions of dollars distributed to Iraq during the fiscal year.
This value is extrapolated to an amount per month t. The value of Ecot can assume
a real number value greater than 0.
3.2 Curve Fitting and Calculating Derivatives
Curve fitting is the process of using a mathematical function to express the rela-
tionship between a set of points. When using a least–squares approach, the goal is
to find the curve which minimizes the sum of the squared error, the error associated
between the known data point, and the fitted point. When the data points do not
appear to be linear, an approach such as polynomial regression may be used. The
problem of fitting a polynomial curve to data is a special case of the general linear
regression where
Y = Xβ + ε (3.6)
becomes
Y = β0 + β1x+ β2x
2 + β3x
3 + . . .+ ε (3.7)
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and is widely used when the response is curvilinear and contains squared or higher-
order terms. The following set of normal equations solve for β in a least–squares
sense
XTXβ̂ = XTy (3.8)
The y vector are the responses or the set of known data points, X is the matrix
of the predictor variables, and β is the vector of the unknown parameters [36:476-
478][29:294-296].
In this research, the method of curve fitting is applied to approximate an equation
as a function of time, t, to the calculated index values. This allows the calculation
of an approximate first-order derivative of the index with respect to t. In terms of
Figure 2 in Section 2.3 this represents the true model, m, and is used in the least-
squares calculations. Typically, the use of the lowest–degree model possible that
adequately explains the relationship is preferred. In order to determine the adequacy
of the fit, the coefficient of determination or R2 is used. This describes the ratio of
the sum of squares
R2 =
SSR
SST
= 1− SSE
SST
(3.9)
where
SSR = Sum of Squares Regression
SST = Sum of Squares Total
SSE = Sum of Squares Error
The R2 statistic must be used with caution because it is possible to force R2 to 1 by
adding unnecessary terms to the model. A model with n − 1 degrees will obtain a
perfect fit, but may not be statistically superior to a model of a lesser degree [36:418].
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After fitting the data to a polynomial function, the task of calculating the deriva-
tive is rather simple and makes use of the power rule
d
dx
(xn) = nxn−1 where n ∈ R. (3.10)
and the result is a polynomial equation of degree n − 1 which describes the fitted
curves rate of change as a function of time.
Through this process, observations of data over time are collected and compiled
into a composite index, which summarizes complex data and assesses the progress over
time as described by Nardo [37:13]. This develops a set of discrete points which can
be used to describe the current state of the PMESI variables at a time, t. The general
trend of the data helps to describe its progress, to capture this trend a polynomial
regression technique is used. The time series plots show that the indices are not convex
and are curvilinear which indicate a polynomial regression would be well suited to
capture the trend. After selecting the proper fit, the PMESI indices can be expressed
as a function of time. The derivative of the function is then calculated and used to
determine the coefficients of the system of differential equations in the least–squares
minimization. Through this series of steps, mean–field theory was applied to perform
the necessary steps to determine the coefficients of the system of differential equations
in the next section.
3.3 Determining the Coefficients of the System of Differential Equations
The final system of differential equations is a set of mean–field equations whose
coefficients are derived by using a nonlinear least–squares method and the derivative
information of the fitted curves. Similar to the index calculations in Section 3.1, each
equation in the differential system corresponds to an operational variable. However,
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the two sets differ in that the system of differential equations expresses each point as
a derivative function of itself (similar to Lanchester Equations), data from the other
operational variables, and data from the US instruments of national power. In this
way, each equation in the system of differential equations can be said to describe the
interrelatedness of all variables in the operational environment while concurrently
capturing the instruments of national power applied by the US. The functional form
of the model represents the rate of change, of each state variable at time, t, as a
function of both the state variables and the forcing functions demonstrated with Ṗt
in Figure 10.
Figure 10. Depiction of the Functional Form
In differential equation form Ṗt is represented as
Ṗt = a11
(
Pt
b11
− 1
)
+ a12
(
Mt
b12
− 1
)
+ a13
(
Et
b13
− 1
)
+ a14
(
St
b14
− 1
)
+ a15
(
It
b15
− 1
)
+ d11Milt + d12Ecot (3.11)
To define the effect of the current state, two coefficients, a and b, are introduced
for each of the PMESI variables.
Effect of the current state = aij
(
xt
bij
− 1
)
(3.12)
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The a coefficient is the scaling factor, it represents the weight of the endogenous
functions or the proportionality of the endogenous function to the rate of change for
a PMESI variable. The b coefficient is the tipping point, it represents the point where
a change in the parameter causes a change in the dynamical property of the system,
much like a bifurcation [26:26-28]. Consider a saddle–node bifurcation in Figure 11,
a saddle point is observed where the x and y axis meet, and from there it takes on
Figure 11. A Saddle Node Bifurcation
opposite trajectories. The tipping point represents a point when x
(j)
t ≈ b the effect
of a variable is generally stable, when the value of x
(j)
t > b there is a magnifying
effect, and when x
(j)
t < b there is a diminishing effect. The dik are the scaling factor
coefficients for the diME forcing functions.
The a and b coefficients are similar to the proportional growth rate (r) and carrying
capacity (K) in the Logistics Differential Equation
dP
dt
= rP
(
1− P
K
)
and in the Johnson and Madin model (Equation 2.16); except in those models the
quantity in the parenthesis is subtracted from 1, and in Equation 3.12 it is the quantity
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minus 1. The reason is that in a population model, the population grows (dP
dt
> 0)
until it reaches its capacity (dP
dt
= 0) and then the growth rate decreases (dP
dt
< 0)
because there is no capacity for the additional population. In Equation 3.12 the effect
is monotonically increasing ∀a, b, and x(j)t , the value of the coefficients and indices
determine the contribution of each variable to the derivative of a specific variable.
This tipping point highlights the advantage of data driven model. Rather than
looking for a subjective assessment from a subject matter expert (SME) the observed
data determines the tipping point. By letting the data drive the value of the coeffi-
cients, the effect relative to the time period and the interrelatedness of the data can
be evaluated. This means when evaluating the military of a country that is building
its strength, the evaluation may be based upon the observations which demonstrate
the development of the military, and how they interact with the other variables in
the operational environment.
To build the functional form of the model the range of the variables must be
defined. The range for aij, bij, and dik are
aij ∈R for i,j=1,2,. . . ,5
bij ∈R | 0 ≤ bij ≤ 1 for i,j=1,2,. . . ,5
dik ∈R for i=1,2,. . . ,5
for k=1,2
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and the resulting system of differential equations is
Ṗt = a11
(
Pt
b11
− 1
)
+ a12
(
Mt
b12
− 1
)
+ a13
(
Et
b13
− 1
)
+ a14
(
St
b14
− 1
)
+ a15
(
It
b15
− 1
)
+ d11Milt + d12Ecot (3.13)
Ṁt = a21
(
Pt
b21
− 1
)
+ a22
(
Mt
b22
− 1
)
+ a23
(
Et
b23
− 1
)
+ a24
(
St
b24
− 1
)
+ a25
(
It
b25
− 1
)
+ d21Milt + d22Ecot (3.14)
Ėt = a31
(
Pt
b31
− 1
)
+ a32
(
Mt
b32
− 1
)
+ a33
(
Et
b33
− 1
)
+ a34
(
St
b34
− 1
)
+ a35
(
It
b35
− 1
)
+ d31Milt + d32Ecot (3.15)
Ṡt = a41
(
Pt
b41
− 1
)
+ a42
(
Mt
b42
− 1
)
+ a43
(
Et
b43
− 1
)
+ a44
(
St
b44
− 1
)
+ a45
(
It
b45
− 1
)
+ d41Milt + d42Ecot (3.16)
İt = a51
(
Pt
b51
− 1
)
+ a52
(
Mt
b52
− 1
)
+ a53
(
Et
b53
− 1
)
+ a54
(
St
b54
− 1
)
+ a55
(
It
b55
− 1
)
+ d51Milt + d52Ecot (3.17)
For compactness, this is defined in matrix notation with the following matrices.
The [Aij]5×5 matrix is made of the a coefficients. The [Bij]5×5 is a matrix of the
inverse of the b coefficients.
A =

a11 a12 a13 a14 a15
a21 a22 a23 a24 a25
a31 a32 a33 a34 a35
a41 a42 a43 a44 a45
a51 a52 a53 a54 a55

B =

1
b11
1
b12
1
b13
1
b14
1
b15
1
b21
1
b22
1
b23
1
b24
1
b25
1
b31
1
b32
1
b33
1
b34
1
bE35
1
b41
1
b42
1
b43
1
b44
1
b45
1
b51
1
b52
1
b53
1
b54
1
b55

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The PMESI variables make up the X matrix and the diME variables make up
the M and E matrices.
X =

P M E S I
P M E S I
P M E S I
P M E S I
P M E S I

M =

Mil1
Mil1
Mil1
Mil1
Mil1

E =

Eco1
Eco1
Eco1
Eco1
Eco1

The d coefficients are 5× 1 matrices defined as
C =

d11
d11
d11
d11
d11

F =

d12
d12
d12
d12
d12

(3.18)
Finally, two matrices of 1’s are required: the first is [1]5×5 and the second is [1]5×1.
To represent these equations in matrix form and conduct the necessary operations, the
Hadamard product (◦) is required. The Hadamard product is defined for two matrices,
A,B ∈ Rm×n where A ◦ B ∈ Rm×n. This product is also known as the element–wise
product because the actual operations conducted are [A]ij × [B]ij = [A ◦ B]ij [34].
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Using the Hadamard product the system of differential equations is
[A ◦ ((X ◦B)− [1]5×5) [1]5×1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(PMESI)
+ (M ◦ C) + (E ◦ F )︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(diME)
=

˙̂
P
˙̂
M
˙̂
E
˙̂
S
˙̂
I

= v (3.19)
In terms of Figure 2 from Section 2.3, this represents the estimated model, m̂.
3.3.1 Solving for a and b.
So that the system of differential equations accurately describes the actual trends
of our operational variables, the system is fit to the derivatives of the fitted–curves
from the previous section. This method has been used by Kleczkowski and Grenfell
to capture similar interactions [28]. In order to solve for the a and b coefficients, the
following least–squares nonlinear minimization problem is formulated
Minimize f(x) =
5∑
i=1
70∑
t=1
(m
(i)
t − m̂
(i)
t )
2 (3.20)
subject to bij ≤ 1 for i, j = 1, . . . , 5 (3.21)
bij > 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , 5 (3.22)
aij, bij, dik ∈ R for i, j = 1, . . . , 5 (3.23)
for k = 1, 2 (3.24)
t ∈ Z+ (3.25)
This method ultimately takes a measure from the space of a stochastic system,
and approximates it through a deterministic set of equations, which determines a cal-
culated derivative for each operational variable. The error (SSE) associated with the
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system is effectively minimized through the fitting of the aij, bij, and dik coefficients.
This is accomplished by using the GRG method for solving nonlinear programs de-
scribed in Section 2.7. There are two points to note in this case:
1. Just like many nonlinear problems, the solution for aij, bij, and dik is not unique.
It is possible to get a similar answer with the different set of coefficients. It is
typical that if there is more than one solution, then there is an infinite number
of solutions that satisfy the equations. It is impossible to have exactly two
solutions.
2. The solution provided is specific to the operational environment being studied.
There is no master set of coefficients or parameters that can be used for all
situations. The so–called ”constant fallacy” described by Helmbold is often
overlooked and leads researchers to believe they have found universal parameters
when they have in fact found parameters specific only to their study [24]. The
coefficients found must be updated when a new or expanded data set is used.
The results provide a mathematical expression of the operational environment,
but with far more insight and capability than the original fitted curves from the
previous section. At this point, the collected data from the operational environment
used to calculate the composite indices cannot be changed without making a new
model, as it reflects the internal environment and interactions between these internal
environment variables. However, insight can be gained by testing changes in the
external environment to see its impacts on the internal environment. Specifically,
modifications to the instruments of national power used by the US in terms of military
troops and economic aid can be implemented and then evaluated to see how these
changes are reflected in the calculated indices.
3.4 Summary
This chapter described the model and the solution methodology. A general overview,
description, and rationale was provided. The creation of the methodology allows for
variation from the user as a means to evaluate the dynamics of a course of action.
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This is a tool to glean insight from varying the diME inputs based upon the dynamics
of the original environment. The methodology may be used to provide the decision
maker with relevant information that will help provide clarity of action.
The strength of this model is capturing the interactions between the operational
variables, as displayed in Figure 1. The same idea was applied in the functional
form (Figure 10) and the system of differential equations (Equations 3.13-3.17). Each
derivative calculated in the system of differential equations is composed of all opera-
tional variables as well as the diME forcing functions.
The data sources used in this research are the similar to other analysis efforts
reviewed in Chapter II. The Brookings Institution data set is maintained monthly
and retrieved from the Department of Defense, Department of State, as well as other
reputable sources in their collection of public data. However, one could argue that
better data exists in either unclassified or classified form. If there is in fact a superior
data set, then that data can be applied as well. The indices can be adjusted to a new
data set and then reapply the methodology. Regardless of the data, the interactions
between the indices are captured, this is the intended design of the model, not the
data. In a perfect scenario, the metrics are defined in advance with established
collection methods and the result is perfect data. In practice this is rarely possible.
Analysis is often initiated after the fact, or after conducting analysis the realization
is that a different metric is needed. The adage better data=better model holds true,
but in reality the best data available is used to create the best model possible because
holding out for perfect is an unaffordable luxury.
The nature of generality is a limitation of this model. In the future sections
different applications of diME are demonstrated to show the impact on the operational
environment, but this will not show how it affected the components of each operational
variable. The model demonstrates the effect, but does not indicate the cause. The
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model calculates a rate of change (derivative) based upon the relationships of the
PMESI and diME, that can be used to determine a predicted index value at a certain
time. This will not provide insight for the components which are used to create the
index.
The methodology described in Chapter III is implemented using a data set from
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The implementation method and results, as well as analysis
from alternate diME strategies, are presented in Chapter IV.
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IV. Implementation and Analysis
This chapter illustrates the utility of the model through an application of data
from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
4.1 Implementation
In late 2002 and early 2003, the US began the initial planning for an operation to
remove Saddam Hussein and overthrow his regime in Iraq. The US was looking for
support to conduct this operation from the United Nations (UN) and the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but was unable to garner support as they hoped.
Even in the US government there were disagreements within Congress, the DOD, and
the populace on whether or not the US should execute this plan. The size and makeup
of the coalition was considerably smaller than that of the one charged with liberating
Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The general perception was while
the coalition forces were outnumbered there would be little resistance; this proved
to be true. The prospects of the stabilization effort however were disputed by top
officials. Then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki argued it would take several
hundred thousand soldiers to stabilize post–war Iraq. Secretary of Defense (SecDef)
Rumsfeld and Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Tommy Franks
disagreed and ultimately the invasion was planned under the assumption that the US
would not lead the stabilization effort [35:23-24].
On the 20th of March 2003 the US–led coalition invaded Iraq to oust Saddam
Hussein with roughly 130,000 US troops and 25,000 British troops. As expected,
there was very little resistance. What happened after that was unexpected; the Iraqi
military dissolved amongst the people and an insurgency evolved. The impacts from
the lack of stabilization planning and shortage of troops had immediate consequences
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and long–term implications. As a result, the US has been involved in SSTRO through
2011, when the majority of troops were removed [35:24].
While the major combat operations, Dominate (Joint Phase III), were from March-
May 2003, the first three months of OIF will be included in this analysis as this
epoch includes the transition period from Dominate to Stabilize (Joint Phase IV).
According to JP 3-0, also illustrated in Figure 12, while the level of effort in SSTRO
Figure 12. Notional Operation Plan Versus Level of Military Effort[18]
or stabilizing activities may be lesser in earlier phases, they are still present in planning
and execution and therefore are included in this analysis. The time period covered
in this analysis is the start of the war through the 70th month, December 2008. This
encompasses roughly five years of monthly data. For this application, the model is
set with initial parameters from the available data sources for month 1, March 2003.
An explanation of the application is covered in the following sections.
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4.1.1 Data Collection and Index Formation.
Data collection started with the beginning of the war (March 2003) through De-
cember 2008. Each data point was collected monthly using the data sources listed
in Section 3.1.1. The data in raw form is presented in Appendix A according to the
five PMESI operational variables and the two diME forcing functions. In accordance
with the guidance provided by the Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators,
the data selected assesses progress over time and summarizes the complex nature of
the indices which they support [37]. Each data point is a monthly indicator, or has
been extrapolated into a monthly indicator. While many aspects, such as economic
aid, does not always have an impact felt at the time of distribution, by extrapolating
the yearly data to monthly data the effect of the aid distributed is felt throughout
the year. This effectively adds a time lag to the data. Any economic result (positive
or negative) is assumed to have evenly distributed effects over the fiscal year.
Once the data has been collected, the indices are formulated and normalized ac-
cording to Section 3.1.1. The weights used in this case are based upon a notional
assessment. With the exception of the Political and Military indices, all the com-
ponents are equally weighted (wi =
1
n
) where n is the number of components. The
Political and Military Index weights are shown in Table 1. The component weights
Table 1. Political and Military Index weights
Political Component Weight (cw) Military Component Weight(cw)
Security Strength 2 ISF KIA 2
Elected Government 2 Coalition Fatalities 1
Displaced persons 1 Attacks on Iraqi Oil and 1
Gas Infrastructure/Personnel
Freedom of Press 1 Iraqi Civilian Fatalities 2
Multiple Fatality Bombings 3
are then calculated in a similar manner (wi =
cw∑
cw
) where cw is the weight of a
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component. The rationale for this weighting is the level of perceived strength and an
elected government in place is twice as strong as the other two components in the
Political Index. In the Military Index, multiple fatality events are extremely powerful
events that sway opinion, thus have three times the impact as the coalition casual-
ties and attacks on infrastructure. The number of ISF and civilians killed also has
a stronger effect than coalition casualties and attacks on infrastructure, but not as
much as multiple casualty events, and therefore, has a weight of two. The weighting
scheme is ultimately up to the decision maker and must be adjusted accordingly by
the analyst.
Each individual index is then plotted as a time series, as depicted in Figure 13.
The calculated index values are presented in Appendix C. The data in this form is a
series of discrete points. To calculate a derivative and determine the rate of change
a continuous function is needed. Certain techniques are discussed Section 4.1.2 that
deal with this issue.
4.1.2 Curve Fitting and Calculating Derivatives.
Next, the normalized data is smoothed to capture the general trend of the index
and any potential noise through the polynomial regression technique described in
Section 3.2. This results in a generalized model, one which is not susceptible to
extraordinary events, yet can still account for them. While any number of tools may
be used to accomplish the curve fitting process, it is important to note the type of
curve selected and its goodness–of–fit are important considerations that need to be
addressed through statistical analysis and modeler experience.
Several types of curves were fit to the data, including: Exponential, Logarithmic,
Linear, and 2nd through 6th degree polynomials. The R2 and end effects were observed
for each curve fit to the data. The curve which best fit every index was selected. Based
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 13. Index Time Series Plots
60
upon the Military Index, the polynomial function was most appropriate because of
the end effects and shape of the data. The R2 from the fitting process is shown in
Table 2.
Table 2. R2 values for the curve fitting process
Polynomial
Expo Log Linear 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Political 0.9118 0.7572 0.9450 0.9495 0.9719 0.9749 0.9765 0.9806
Military 0.0351 0.1713 0.0309 0.7378 0.7754 0.7971 0.8420 0.8532
Economic 0.8579 0.4514 0.7168 0.8484 0.8838 0.8968 0.9423 0.9571
Social 0.6346 0.3619 0.6265 0.7650 0.8364 0.8816 0.9079 0.9194
Infrastructure 0.5477 0.7694 0.8472 0.8498 0.8512 0.8677 0.8693 0.8802
The fit selected was a 4th degree polynomial because it minimized the SSE, was
the lowest degree polynomial with all R2 ≥ 0.8, and by inspection the end effects
provided a more adequate match than any of the curves listed above. The equations
of the fitted polynomial curves are provided in Table 3. The values of the β coefficients
are precise to a level of significance greater than 10 places, as a result the full set is
not shown here but the full precision table is presented in Appendix B. The results of
Table 3. 4th degree polynomial equations
Index Equation
Political yP = 1.2e− 007t4 − 2.3e− 005t3 + 0.0013t2 − 0.015t+ 0.28
Military yM = −2.5e− 007t4 + 4.1e− 005t3 − 0.0018t2 + 0.01t+ 0.83
Economic yE = −2.5e− 007t4 + 4.2e− 005t3 − 0.0021t2 + 0.04t+ 0.0042
Social yS = 6.8e− 008t4 − 8.2e− 006t3 + 0.00032t2 − 0.0038t+ 0.47
Infrastructure yI = −1.2e− 007t4 + 1.7e− 005t3 − 0.00085t2 + 0.02t+ 0.013
the fitting process are summarized in Table 4 and graphically depicted in Figure 14.
The idea of using curve fitting to approximate the indices accomplishes two things;
a continuous function which describes the trend of the discrete index values is provided
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 14. Index Fitted Polynomial Equation Plots
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Table 4. 4th degree polynomial fitting summary results
Equation SSE R2
Political 0.104919 0.9749
Military 0.512325 0.7971
Economic 0.427826 0.8967
Social 0.011129 0.8816
Infrastructure 0.102024 0.8677
and the function can be used to calculate a rather simple derivative (many functions
used to fit data–exponential, logarithmic, and polynomial functions have rather simple
derivative functions). This captures the general trend of the data, accounts for the
noise in the data, accounts for large deviations from the trend, but most importantly
of all it is not highly reactive to sharp spikes and drops.
The derivatives of the equations in Table 3 are calculated with respect to t using
Equation 3.10 and the result is provided in Table 5, and graphically in Figure 15. The
values of the coefficients are precise to a level of significance greater than 10 places,
as a result the full set is not shown here but is presented in Appendix B.
Table 5. Derivatives of the polynomial fitted equations
Index Derivative
Political dP
dt
= 4.74e− 07t3 − 6.75e− 05t2 + 2.66e− 03t− 1.47e− 02
Military dM
dt
= −9.82e− 07t3 + 1.22e− 04t2 − 3.54e− 03t+ 1.02e− 02
Economic dE
dt
= −9.82e− 07t3 + 1.26e− 04t2 − 4.23e− 03t+ 4.03e− 02
Social dS
dt
= 2.74e− 07t3 − 2.46e− 05t2 + 6.44e− 04t− 3.76e− 03
Infrastructure dI
dt
= −4.74e− 07t3 + 5.23e− 05t2 − 1.70e− 03t+ 2.01e− 02
The derivatives of the fitted curve at each point, t, are used to approximate the
derivative function of the operational variables. This is an integral part in calculating
the coefficients of the final system of differential equations, completed in Section 4.1.3.
In the next section, the rates of change for each variable at a given time, t, are found
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 15. Fitted Polynomial Derivative Plots
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by calculating the derivatives of the approximate functions through the system of
differential equations.
4.1.3 Determining the Coefficients of the System of Differential Equa-
tions.
To fit the system of differential equations, the coefficients are derived through
the nonlinear least–squares method. The derivative functions in Table 5 are used to
calculate m
(i)
t in the minimization (Equation 3.20). Using the nonlinear program,
the values of aij, bij, and dik coefficients are calculated which minimize the SSE as
described in Equations 3.20-3.25 through the GRG method. The resulting aij, bij,
and dik are then used in Equations 3.13–3.17 in Section 3.3 which calculate the m̂
(i)
t
in Equation 3.20. The a, b, and d coefficients are provided in Tables 6–8. The values
of these coefficients are precise to a level of significance greater than 10 places. As a
result, the full tables are not shown here, but are presented in Appendix B.
Table 6. a coefficients
i
j
Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Political -0.0108181 -0.0200317 0.0000199 0.0040096 0.0035656
Military 0.0743136 0.0168815 0.0002164 -0.0101848 -0.0241455
Economic 0.0287454 0.0155291 -0.0008631 -0.0100445 -0.0156717
Social -0.0005479 0.0001096 0.0004305 0.0246105 0.0021363
Infrastructure 0.0034676 0.0008256 -0.0010147 -0.0264765 -0.0054859
The coefficients are calculated by minimizing the SSE; Table 9 shows the SSE
attributed to each calculated derivative as well as the overall SSE that was minimized
by the nonlinear program. The derivatives (calculated and fitted) are then plotted
to see how good of an approximation the system of differential equations provides,
as shown in Figure 16. In applying mean–field theory, the errors associated
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 16. Calculated Derivative Plots– The solid lines represent the derivatives from
the polynomial function and the dashed lines are those calculated from the system of
differential equations.
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Table 7. b coefficients
i
j
Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Political 0.3980158 0.6319466 0.0061526 0.0894118 0.1010944
Military 0.9093994 0.5026149 0.5234950 0.1443637 0.6481461
Economic 0.4439128 0.3606699 0.1873238 0.1093262 0.3084922
Social 0.1788101 0.0781656 0.0700705 0.4343948 0.2960607
Infrastructure 0.2387622 0.0769009 0.1342082 0.3479762 0.2603047
Table 8. d coefficients
i
k
Military Economic
Political -0.0074973 -0.0008035
Military 0.0230743 0.0007235
Economic 0.0184431 0.0007638
Social -0.0017058 0.0008385
Infrastructure 0.0049494 -0.0005529
with the approximations can be expected to be normally distributed, as mentioned
in Section 2.5. To determine if the errors are approximately normally distributed,
a Normal Probability Plot is conducted. Based on mean-field theory, the data are
plotted against a theoretical normal distribution and should fall along the diagonal if
they are normally distributed, deviations from this trend indicate a departure from
normality. A normal probability plot is shown in Figure 17 and depicts the error
between the calculated and fitted derivative. The plots in Figure 17 indicate there are
some deviations from normality, but the data are contained within the 95% confidence
bands and one can assume normality in the errors associated with approximating
derivatives through the system of differential equations.
The calculated derivatives indicate the rate of change in the system for each
operational variable. The derivatives provide useful information; however, if the rate
of change and a starting point are known, then a calculated index (P̂ , M̂ , Ê, Ŝ, Î) can
67
(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 17. Normal Probability Plots (Derivative)– The data should plot along the
diagonal if they are normal, if the data are contained within the dashed confidence
bands then one can reasonably assume normality.
68
Table 9. System of differential equations SSE
Derivative SSE
Political 0.00122978
Military 0.00222477
Economic 0.00282604
Social 0.00009662
Infrastructure 0.000337669
Total 0.00671488
be used to gain more insight. This is an initial value problem. One method of solving
first-order differential equations with a numerical method is the Euler method, which
uses the derivative and the initial value to estimate the solution. The Euler method
is
uk+1 = uk + hak for k = 0, 1, . . . , n (4.1)
where ak = u
′
k and h is the step size [23:394-397]. Numerical methods like this are
especially insightful when an exact solution cannot be found, as in this case. Through
an application of this method, the index values can be estimated through the knowl-
edge of an initial value and the derivatives provided from the system of differential
equations. Using this method, with h = 1, the approximate index is calculated and
compared to the original index values in Figure 18. While the calculated index cap-
tures the general trend of the index values, it loses some accuracy as it is only given
an initial value from data and then calculated purely from estimated data over the
entire period. This estimation can be established as the solution with the most er-
ror; if additional values from other points in time are available to provide trajectory
corrections, it would decrease the error.
The plots in Figure 18 indicate that some accuracy has been lost in the process.
Once again, the normal probability plots are used to determine if the error is normally
distributed. From the plots in Figure 19, normality can only be assumed with the
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 18. Calculated Indices versus Actual Indices– The solid lines represent the
calculated indices from the Euler method and the points are the actual monthly index
values.
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 19. Normal Probability Plots (Euler Method)– The data should plot along the
diagonal if they are normal, if the data are contained within the dashed confidence
bands then one can reasonably assume normality.
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Political and Military Index. The remaining three indicate departures from normal-
ity and have values outside the 95% confidence level band. This is not completely
unexpected as the second estimated data point is based upon the initial value and an
estimated derivative, the third is based upon the second estimated point and the es-
timated derivative, and so on. It is not difficult to see how method which builds upon
estimations can lead to an over or underestimation. Based upon Figure 19, it can be
observed that Figure 19c and Figure 19e are positively skewed and Figure 19d is neg-
atively skewed asserting they are non-normal. A Shapiro-Wilk Goodness-of-Fit test
was conducted and the results are in Table 10. From this table and Figures 19a and
Table 10. Shapiro-Wilk goodness-of-fit test
Calculated Index p-value
Political 0.2873
Military 0.6141
Economic < 0.0001
Social < 0.0001
Infrastructure 0.0021
b, the conclusion can be made that the Political and Military error is normally dis-
tributed, indicating the successful application of the mean-field approximation. When
the Shapiro-Wilk Goodness-of-Fit test is applied (α = 0.05) one fails to reject the
error is normally distributed. In this case, the Political Index has a p-value of 0.2873
and the Military Index has a p-value of 0.6141 while the other three have p-values
less than α = 0.05. This indicates the mean-field method captures the general trend
of the variable it is approximating when the data that provides the approximation is
appropriate. The inference here is that the data which builds the Economic, Social,
and Infrastructure indices may be biased, collection methods may have changed, or
the data needs to be improved, indicating an area for future research.
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4.2 Analysis of Alternate Strategies
In this section the methodology is applied to evaluate alterative strategies which
reflect possible modifications to the military and economic (diME) influence as applied
by the US in Iraq. The following sections organize modifications to economic and
military data (on the side of the US) into different strategies. These modifications
are derived from actual implemented plans, proposed legislation from Congress, or
are hypothetical and demonstrate the what-if analysis feature of the model.
4.2.1 No Surge.
On the 10th of January 2007, President George W. Bush delivered a speech to the
American Public outlining a new strategy in Iraq. As part of that strategy he called
for the additional deployment of 20, 000 troops, the majority deploying to Baghdad
to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, help them protect the population, and
help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security
needed [11]. The first deployment of troops was in January 2007 and in July 2007 all
surge troops had been deployed. The surge would last to July 2008 and was roughly
an increase of 28, 000 troops [39].
The actual troop numbers for the Milt variable represent the surge strategy and
serve as the base case for evaluating the alternate strategies. In order to evaluate
the no surge strategy, the Milt are adjusted under the assumption that if the surge
was not implemented, the number of troops would have remained the same during
for the time period. Therefore, the number of troops are held constant from the
December 2006 level through February 2009 (when the troop level returned to near
the pre–surge level). The adjusted levels of Milt are listed in Appendix D. All other
variables remain the same, specifically the coefficients are not changed as the goal is
to evaluate the alternative strategy under the conditions that took place. In other
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words, if everything else remained the same how would the indices have been affected
by the no surge policy? The results are shown in Figure 20.
The observation here is how the indices change over time based upon a different
troop level, while keeping all other variables constant. The change in the Milt vari-
ables did have impacts on all the variables, some more than others. The plots are
exactly identical up until month 47 (there is no change in the inputs until month 48)
where the surge began, and then takes a different trajectory based upon the interac-
tions from the different data. As a result the trajectory, of the Political and Social
indices slightly improved over time; the Military, Economic, and Infrastructure tra-
jectories decreased over time. A t–test on the difference of the means is established
with the following hypothesis:
H0 : µbasecase − µnosurge = 0
HA : µbasecase − µnosurge 6= 0
α = 0.05
This tests the hypothesis that there is no difference between the alternate strategy (no
surge) and the actual strategy (base case). The results from the tests are in Table 11
and shows in all cases H0 is rejected because all p-values are less than alpha, as shown
in the first row of the table. This confirms changing the Milt has a significant effect
on the indices at the α = 0.05 level. The second line of the table shows the Military,
Economic, and Infrastructure Index difference means are significantly greater then 0,
indicating the base case indices were significantly higher at the α = 0.05 level. The
third line indicates the opposite, the Political and Social Index difference means were
significantly less than 0 and the no surge indices where higher than the base case, all
at the α = 0.05 level.
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 20. Calculated Index Plots (No Surge)– The solid lines represent the calculated
indices of the Euler solution and the dashed lines represent the indices under the no
surge alternative. The error bars show the 95% Confidence Interval associated with the
end effect.
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Table 11. t-test on the difference of means between the base case and no surge
Test Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Prob >| t | < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0016 < 0.0001
Prob > t 1 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.9992 < 0.0001
Prob < t < 0.0001 1 1 < 0.0008 1
Additionally there is 95% Confidence Interval (CI) on the t = 70 observation
which shows the error associated with the end effects. This is calculated by
x
(j)
70 ± t(n−1,1−α2 )
√
S2(n)
n
(4.2)
where
α = 0.05
n = the number of observations
S2 = the sample variance
1.9959 = t(n−1,1−α2 )
This CI is built around the x
(j)
70 observation versus x̄
(j) to compare the end effects
vice the mean. Even with the associated error, there is still a significant difference
in the Military, Economic, and Infrastructure indices between the two strategies in
the final time period. Based on the results from the model, it can be concluded
that the no surge policy implemented had impacts on all of the PMESI indices. The
results in Table 11 show the difference of means for the Political and Social Index
is greater than 0 indicating the mean of the no surge index was greater than the
mean of the base case index. In the others, the mean of the no surge was less than
0, indicating the mean of the base case was greater than the no surge policy. Based
on Table 12, the end effects of the Political, Social, and Infrastructure indices have
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Table 12. 95% confidence interval on the end effects (base case vs. no surge)
Base Case No Surge Overlap?
Political (0.922384,1) (0.93787,1) Yes
Military (0.639915,0.709656) (0.524145,0.59624) No
Economic (0.741091,0.819947) (0.643858,0.7086) No
Social (0.786461,0.82957 ) (0.783501,0.826717) Yes
Infrastructure (0.107126,0.133476) (0.087413,0.11328) Yes
overlapping CIs indicating the change is insignificant. The remaining plots do not
have overlapping CIs which confirm the results of the t–test and demonstrate that
the alternative application of the no surge diME affected the trajectory of the index
in a significant manner based on the dynamics of the operational environment.
4.2.2 Complete Reduction by 2008.
In March–July of 2007, Congress proposed a series of resolutions that would lead
to the removal of US troops in Iraq. The first one, House Resolution (H.R.) 1951
was passed by Congress and vetoed by President Bush; H.R. 2956 was passed by the
House and required the SecDeF to initiate the reduction of troops in Iraq immediately
through April 1, 2008. This resolution was then sent to the Senate where it was
narrowly defeated 52-47. This was never introduced again and the current surge plan
continued as outlined in January of 2007 [53].
To evaluate the withdrawal strategy, assume that the March Resolution passed
and the number of troops were reduced in even increments over the next year leading
to no troops in April 2008. The adjusted levels of Milt are listed in Appendix D. All
other variables remain the same, as in the previous case. In other words, if everything
else remained the same how would a phased withdrawal implemented in 2007 affect
the indices? The results are shown in Figure 21.
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 21. Calculated Index Plots (Withdrawal)– The solid lines represent the calcu-
lated indices from the Euler solution and the dashed lines represent the indices under
the withdrawal alternative. The error bars show the 95% Confidence Interval associated
with the end effect.
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The observation here is how the indices changed over time based upon the with-
drawal troop level and timeline, with all other variables constant. The change in the
Milt variables did have effects on all the variables, some more than others. The plots
are exactly identical up until month 50 where the withdrawal began and then takes
on a different trajectory, based upon the interactions from the different data. As a
result, the trajectory of the Political and Social indices slightly improved over time;
the Military, Economic, and Infrastructure trajectories decreased over time. The re-
sults from Table 13 indicate this a little more clearly. A t–test on the difference of
the means, H0 : µbasecase−µwithdraw = 0 and HA : µbasecase−µwithdraw 6= 0 at α = 0.05
shows in all cases H0 is rejected because all p-values are less than alpha, as shown
in the first row of the table. This confirms changing the Milt has a significant effect
on the indices at the α = 0.05 level. The second line of the table shows the Military,
Economic, and Infrastructure Index difference means are significantly greater then 0,
indicating the base case indices were significantly higher at the α = 0.05 level. The
third line indicates the opposite, the Political and Social Index difference means were
significantly less than 0 and the withdraw indices where higher than the base case,
all at the α = 0.05 level.
Table 13. t-test on the difference of means between the base case and withdraw
Test Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Prob >| t | < 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 < 0.0001 0.0002
Prob > t 1 0.0001 0.0001 1 0.0001
Prob < t < 0.0001 0.9999 0.9999 < 0.0001 0.9999
After interpreting the results in Table 13, it can be seen that the withdraw policy
had impacts on all of the PMESI indices. Based on the results, the difference of
means for the Political and Social Index is greater than 0 indicating the mean of the
withdraw index was greater than the mean of the base case index. In the others,
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Table 14. 95% confidence interval on the end effects (base case vs. withdraw)
Base Case Withdraw Overlap?
Political (0.922384,1) (0.93678,1) Yes
Military (0.639915,0.709656) (0.066189,0.155942) No
Economic (0.741091,0.819947) (0.271422,0.315198) No
Social (0.786461,0.82957) (0.798613,0.843939) Yes
Infrastructure (0.107126,0.133476) (-0.00573,0.023497) No
the mean of the withdraw was less than 0, indicating the mean of the base case was
greater than the no surge policy. However, the end effects in Table 14 demonstrate
that the alternative application of the withdraw diME affected the trajectory of the
index in a significant manner based on the dynamics of the operational environment.
The overlapping CI on the end effects of the Political and Social Index indicate the
change on those trajectories is insignificant.
4.2.3 Two Year Earlier Surge.
A look at some scenarios which may be alternatives in future operations can
demonstrate the wargaming ability of this model. One which will be examined is the
notion of executing the surge approximately two years earlier and after two years of
conflict. In order to evaluate this strategy, the assumption is the same troop numbers
were used in the exact same manner only two years earlier. The numbers of troops
prior to and after the surge were adjusted slightly so that the progression continued
in a logical manner with the flow of troops. The adjusted levels of Milt are listed
in Appendix D. All other variables remain the same, as in the previous case. In this
scenario, an earlier surge implemented in 2004 is examined to see how it impacted
the indices. The results are shown in Figure 22.
The observation here is how the indices change based upon the early surge and with
all other variables constant. The change in the Milt variables had similar effects on
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 22. Calculated Index Plots (Early Surge)– The solid lines represent the calcu-
lated indices from the Euler solution and the dashed lines represent the indices under
the Early Surge alternative. The error bars show the 95% Confidence Interval associated
with the end effect.
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all the variables, much like the previous two cases. The plots are exactly identical up
until month 24 where the early surge plan begins, then takes on a different trajectory,
based upon the interactions from the different data. Unlike the previous two cases the
early surge indices deviate from the base case and then intersect the base case plots
again in four out of the five indices. In this case, only the Political Index initially
worsened, however it did return to the path of the original plot as it approached
month 70. The remaining four indices all increased initially and then dropped below
the base case plots towards the end of the time period with the exception of the Social
variable which remained at the increased rate. The results from Table 15 indicate
this a little more clearly.
Table 15. t-test on the difference of means between the base case and early surge
Test Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Prob >| t | < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.7363
Prob > t < 0.0001 1 1 1 0.6319
Prob < t 1 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.3681
Table 16. 95% confidence interval on the end effects (base case vs. early surge)
Base Case Early Surge Overlap?
Political (0.922384,1) (0.923514,1) Yes
Military (0.639915,0.709656) (0.602759,0.66226) Yes
Economic (0.741091,0.819947) (0.710834,0.790809) Yes
Social (0.786461,0.82957) (0.81284,0.85985) Yes
Infrastructure (0.107126,0.133476) (0.076573,0.104759) No
A t–test on the difference of the means, H0 : µbasecase − µearlysurge = 0 and HA :
µbasecase−µearlysurge 6= 0 at α = 0.05 shows that in four out of five cases H0 is rejected
because all p-values are less than alpha. In the case of the Infrastructure Index, H0
cannot be rejected, as shown in the first row of the table. This confirms changing
the Milt has a significant effect on the all except the Infrastructure Index at the
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α = 0.05 level. The second line of the table shows the Political Index difference
mean is significantly greater then 0, indicating the base case indices were significantly
higher at the α = 0.05 level. The third line indicates the Military, Economic, and
Social Index difference means were significantly less than 0 and the early surge indices
where higher than the base case, all at the α = 0.05 level.
Based on the results in Table 15, it can be concluded that there were significant
impacts in all indices except Infrastructure, Table 16 confirms this with overlapping
CIs at t = 70 in all except Infrastructure and the overall trajectory was not affected.
This may indicate an alternate strategy of an early surge versus a surge in 2007
would have both had similar impacts with the exception of Infrastructure. The tra-
jectory of the early surge index was impacted minimally based on the dynamics of
the operational environment.
4.2.4 Even–Spending Strategy.
In addition to varying the troop levels, the ability to look at some scenarios
involving the economic aid and explore the impact of the Ecot variable are also
possible. One examined is the notion of executing a flat or even-spending strategy.
In this case, a constant spending level of $4.822 billion per year is assumed, which is
the average spending for the first five years. The adjusted levels of Ecot are listed in
Appendix D. All other variables remain the same, troop numbers remain at the base
case level. In this scenario how an even–spending plan implemented would affect the
indices is examined. The results are shown in Figure 23.
This instance shows the indices changed based upon the evenly distributed spend-
ing strategy with all other variables constant is observed. The change in the Ecot
variables did affect each variable, much like the previous cases. The changes are ob-
served almost immediately as the spending strategy has been altered from the very
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(a) Political (b) Military
(c) Economic (d) Social
(e) Infrastructure
Figure 23. Calculated Index Plots (Even–Spending)– The solid lines represent the
calculated indices from the Euler solution and the dashed lines represent the indices
under the Even–Spending alternative. The error bars show the 95% Confidence Interval
associated with the end effect.
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beginning. In this scenario, a difference exists in every plot, the Political and Social
appear to decrease and the remaining all show increases. Once again, the significance
of the differences is tested. The results are listed in Table 17.
Table 17. t-test on the difference of means between the base case and even-spending
Test Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
Prob >| t | < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Prob > t < 0.0001 1 1 < 0.0001 1
Prob < t 1 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 1 < 0.0001
A t–test on the difference of the means, H0 : µbasecase − µearlysurge = 0 and HA :
µbasecase−µearlysurge 6= 0 at α = 0.05 shows that in all cases H0 is rejected because all
p-values are less than alpha. This confirms changing the Ecot has a significant affect
on the indices at the α = 0.05 level. The second line of the table shows the Political
and Social indices difference means are significantly greater then 0, indicating the base
case indices were significantly higher at the α = 0.05 level. The third line indicates
the Military, Economic, and Infrastructure Index difference means were significantly
less than 0 and that the even–spending indices where higher than the base case, all
at the α = 0.05 level.
Table 18. 95% confidence interval on the end effects (base case vs. even-spending)
Base Case Even-Spending Overlap?
Political ( 0.922384,1) (0.880909,0.993017) Yes
Military ( 0.639915,0.709656) ( 0.730415,0.795904) No
Economic ( 0.741091,0.819947) ( 0.852733,0.949412) No
Social ( 0.786461,0.82957) (0.677516,0.705383) No
Infrastructure ( 0.107126,0.133476) (0.238472,0.277943) No
Interestingly, this is the only strategy which had a noticeable change in the social
environment. Based upon the result, one may deduce that an even-spending strategy
impacts all of the PMESI indices. Based on the results in Table 17, it can be seen
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the difference of means for the Political and Social indices are less than 0 indicating
the mean of the base case index was greater than the mean of the even-spending
index. In the others, the mean of the difference was greater than 0 indicating the
mean of the base case was less than the even–spending policy. As shown in Figure 23
and Table 18 the end effects of the Political Index have overlapping CIs indicating
the change is insignificant. The remaining plots do not have overlapping CIs which
confirm the results of the t–test and demonstrate the alternative application of the
even–spending diME affected the trajectory of the index in a significant manner based
on the dynamics of the operational environment. It may also be inferred that varying
the economic aid may demonstrate a more prominent impact than the troop level
based on the four cases presented here.
4.2.5 Summary.
As hypothesized, the model provides a means to evaluate various strategies through
changing the inputs which are available to the US In all but one instance, changing
an exogenous variable resulted in a statistically significant difference which could then
be determined to have an increasing or decreasing affect as well. However, the differ-
ences did not always lead to a changed trajectory or differing end effects. While no
one variable resulted in improving the indices in each case, it is clear to see there are
rewards and costs associated with changing the inputs. Once again, it is important to
note this set of coefficients and equations is currently based upon the data provided
to build the model. Changing one of the inputs will not have the same effect in all
cases, as mentioned previously in Section 3.3.1.
As previously mentioned, the strength of this model is the interactions between
the operational variables, the interrelatedness between the PMESI variables within
the operational environment. This is demonstrated in the analysis as well; in each
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of the previous four sections a change in one forcing function led to changes in each
index. The changes were not linear (increase in X = increase in Y ), but rather
nonlinear and a result of all the variables changing. A change in one forcing function
changes all equations in the system, thereby affecting the entire system (operational
environment). The resulting changes often produced a measurable difference in the
index. This ability to collect, analyze, and interpret data provides insight on the diME
functions, ultimately helping to understand its effects within and on the operational
environment.
The interpretation of the results may not always be easy to understand; some
of the cases in the previous sections may be interpreted differently by analysts and
decision makers. The result is an impact, one that is without complete understanding
of the cause. This is due to the generality of the model, the decision maker is provided
with insight, and information regarding the strategy, the results are not omniscient.
4.3 Application to SSTRO
In order to apply this to additional SSTRO there is one requirement– data. The
indices are created in such a manner that they are not dependent upon a specific
data element nor are they required to be fashioned in the exact same manner as this
application. The primary driver in the Iraqi economy is considered to be revenues
from oil exports so it is considered in the development of these indices. This may not
be the case in other states, but the same type of information must be captured. For
example, if this were applied to a country within US Africa Command (AFRICOM),
oil revenues may be a piece of the economy but revenue from mining operations
would be an important aspect as well. In addition, the instruments of national power
may differ slightly as well based on the application. The DIME forcing functions
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and the PMESII variables construct the basic framework, which forms the basis for
measurement.
One possible use of this model is to provide wargamers a tool which will allow for
the evaluation of strategies. The analyst can turn the dials of certain aspects of war
and see how such changes affect the operational variables of the host nation. While the
application presented in this research was post-analysis, the ability to provide current
and future analysis is present. History has a way of repeating itself and this can be an
advantage in analysis. If there was a growing sentiment that SSTRO was needed in
country X, planners could use this tool to wargame certain strategies. For instance,
historical data from country X can be used to derive the coefficients, or even data
from similar or neighboring countries may provide useful insights to appropriately
plan SSTRO. An interested analyst could then, for example, observe the affects of
adding 50,000 troops and a 10% increase in economic aid to a host nation. The
result would demonstrate the causal relationship in how the instruments of national
power serving as inputs affect the operational environment output. Furthermore,
the analyst could test and evaluate different strategies and consider the positive and
negative results from each. This capability, to conduct tradeoff analysis between
competing strategies, could save money, time, and lives.
4.4 Summary
This chapter served to illustrate the application of the model and solution method-
ology. Actual data from OIF provided the framework for the application and possible
(actual and notional) strategies demonstrated the usefulness of this research effort.
The insights gathered may be used by planners to determine force strategy and con-
duct campaign analysis. The end state is to provide the decision maker with the
proper framework to achieve clarity of action in the decision.
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This research provides a good step forward to evaluate the complexities of SSTRO,
however, there remains areas which can be addressed and further the research. Chap-
ter V presents a discussion on the overall conclusions and recommendations for future
research.
89
V. Conclusions and Recomendations
This chapter reviews the significant insights, identifies topics for future research
efforts, and presents conclusions.
5.1 Review
In support of the US Army Center for Army Analysis efforts to develop analytical
methods for use in Irregular Warfare operations, this research develops a methodol-
ogy which evaluates the effects of leveraging the instruments of national power in the
operational environment. The developed model attempts to capture the interrelat-
edness and complexities reflective of an actual operational environment. In so doing,
it captures each moment of the operational environment as the total contribution of
each internal and external variable– the sum of its parts.
The shift in warfare as described in FM 3.0 has gone from around the people to
among the people [20]. This change marks a new paradigm beyond how we fight
and into how we form our operations. The ability to measure the PMESII variables
parallels the work performed by military planners. If operations are planned in this
context, it makes sense to measure and evaluate them in the same context. This model
provides insight to the analyst on the application of the instruments of national power
in terms of the operational environment to be considered.
This research has proposed a methodology to solve a problem currently facing
strategic planners. In researching this problem, it is discovered that there are models
which look at operational effectiveness, models which predict instability, and models
which determine which countries are candidates to provide SSTRO. However, there
are no models which look at the tools available to conduct SSTRO and evaluate their
impact through the variables which describe the operational environment.
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5.2 Insights
This model was proposed as an inverse problem; through the available data an
estimated model was derived. Following some of the extensive work in the field of
Lanchester equations, a system of differential equations was developed to capture the
interrelatedness of the PMESI variables. The number of independent variables makes
this complex system of differential equations difficult to solve; however, the applica-
tion of mean-field theory reduces the complexity and facilitates the solution. This
is accomplished by applying a composite index value to approximate the variables.
The errors of this approximation method are assumed to be normally distributed and
after applying the approximation, Figure 17 demonstrates that with an α = 0.05 the
assumption of normality of errors is valid.
After formulating the problem, the coefficients of the system of differential equa-
tions are derived by applying a nonlinear least–squares minimization problem. This
minimizes the error between the fitted line derivatives and the system of differential
equations while solving for the coefficients. The result is a model which describes the
effects of applying diME through the PMESI variables. This methodology demon-
strates a procedure using common software, available on most computers, and data
that is available to anyone.
The application conducted in this research demonstrates some of the abilities of
this model, such as what-if analysis. This allows the analyst to detect a statistical
difference in indices as a result of adjusting the diME levels, as well as determining
if it was a positive or negative change.
This methodology provides an analyst means to collect, analyze, and interpret
data which helps to better understand the importance and effects of DIME and its
relationship with the operational environment. Understanding the dynamics that
make up the operational environment is paramount to understanding the SSTRO
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mission. The methodology proposed in this research allows analysts and decision
makers the ability to investigate varying applications of the instruments of national
power in a SSTRO environment.
The methodology encompasses:
• A data collection effort which leads to the development of normalized PMESI
indices which describe the general trend of the operational environment with
respect to that variable.
• A numerical technique which helps to understand how the general trend of
a variable changes as a function of time with respect to the dynamics of the
operational environment.
• A tool which integrates the data and provides a graphical depiction of how
differing applications of diME respond given an established set of dynamics for
the operational environment.
Within a specific environment, this model may be used to provide relevant infor-
mation to a decision maker. This is limited by certain factors which are critical aspects
of the methodology. The reliance on actual data underscores a salient limitation– the
model is robust to the extent of available, quality data. As with many research efforts,
better data makes for better models. Furthermore, the weights assigned in the com-
posite index creation and different curve-fitting techniques will affect the final output.
The decision makers vision of the weighting hierarchy must be captured to reflect his
or her true beliefs. Analysts must be rigorous in their application of methods when
applying the presented solution methodology to ensure the output is credible. Of
utmost importance is what Helmbold refers to as the constant fallacy, the coefficients
derived are not constants which can then be applied in all applications [24]. The co-
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efficients are specific to environment (time and space) whose dynamics they describe.
No model is perfect; but the initial results from this research are promising.
5.3 Potential Future Research
While conducting this research several ideas for improvement came up, some were
implemented right away, others fall in the category of outside the scope of this effort
and are tagged for future research endeavors. These topics for future research are
discussed within this section.
5.3.1 Data Refinement.
The data collection and weighting scheme are an area for future research. As
stated earlier, one of the features of this model is the use of the data we have, not the
data we wish we had. This indicates the model is quite capable with limited data;
however, with better data the full potential of the model can be realized. Numerous
open sources of data, such as that provided by the World Bank, collect several of
the metrics currently used and several more metrics that may be used. A robust
analysis which compiles these data sets and uses a multivariate analysis technique
such as principal components analysis or factor analysis to determine what set of
components or factors can provide information on the operational variables would be
of use. This would identify the smallest subset of variables which explain the greatest
amount of variance, and would make logical candidates to form the indices.
The current baseline in the model normalizes the index components by the maxi-
mum and minimum observations. This may not always indicate the true benchmark
for success or failure of that component. One method to remedy this is the establish-
ment of a common baseline. This common baseline would take into account several
countries and establish levels which indicate success or failure based upon the cur-
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rent levels of those countries. This group of countries may include similar countries
with respect to their geographic location, culture, religion, language, economy, and
government. This would allow the normalization of the component scores to consider
more than just the best and worst observations for the evaluated time period.
The normalization method is a strictly linear function; many of the components
do have a point of diminishing returns, indicating that a sigmoid function and its S
shape may be a better way to express the normalization function. For instance, the
difference between 20 and 24 hours of electricity a day will have more impact with
a linear function versus a sigmoid function. The four hours make up one-eighth of a
day, but truly may be insignificant. The heart of this problem will be determining
what is good enough.
The weighting scheme can often be a point of contention amongst decision makers.
The weights in this analysis represent a subjective proportionality assessment. In
order to tailor the weights to allow the decision maker the most flexibility and ease
of use, a Rank Order Centroid method can be implemented
Wi =
1
M
M∑
n=1
1
rn
(5.1)
where M is the number of items, rn is the rank of the n
th item and Wi is the weight
of the ith item. This allows the analyst to easily turn the decision maker’s preference
into weights. This also allows the analyst to implement equal weighting, if that is
desired as well. If there is a group of decision makers, the analyst can make use of
their individual weights to develop an overall weighting scheme based on the group.
There are several methods in multi-attribute utility theory which may be applied as
well, however, many of them can be difficult to translate and implement with a group
of people unfamiliar with the theory.
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5.3.2 Retribution.
The current model only makes use of the actions that the US can impact. While
planning is often well thought and meticulous down to the last detail, a common
adage is that no plan survives first contact. So for every US action, it can be assumed
there may be an adversary reaction, intended to counteract the plan. The inclusion
of factors which are contrary to objectives of the US in the model would provide
an additional level of fidelity and provide more insight to the application of the
instruments of national power. This would require detailed threat analysis and would
likely be different for every country, and perhaps at regional or lower levels.
This may be instituted through the inclusion of stochastic shocks, ωt, to the
system. The ωt can be a random occurrence which impacts the derivative of an index
during the time period. This would capture events which are unpredictable, both
good and bad, and would be an after–the–fact adjustment to the derivative of the
index.
The addition of an insurgent action term in the functional form might be a plau-
sible action to accomplish this aspect. This could be similar to the DIME aspect
and represent insurgent leadership, information capabilities, strength, and economic
status. This data would not likely be found in a public database; however, there are
force-to-population models which estimate insurgent strength, the leadership (legiti-
mate and perhaps illegitimate) structure is often available for an AOR, and a simple
ordinal ranking system could be used to provide a metric on other components.
5.3.3 Effects of the Operational Environment.
In FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, the idea of describing the effects of the operational
environment is a part of the Intelligence Preparation process that takes place after
defining the operational environment. There are six socio–cultural factors listed to
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evaluate the people: (1) Society, (2) Social Structure, (3) Culture, (4) Language,
(5) Power and Authority, and (6) Interests [19:3-3,3-14].
The implementation of some or all of these factors in this model would lead to
a better understanding of how the operational environment is affected by the appli-
cation of the US instruments of national power. Very few nation-states are exactly
alike and understanding the complexities that make them unique is paramount to un-
derstanding the operational environment. This is similar to the work by Yamamota
which looked at the assimilation of different ethnicities into a single nation considering
the aspects of Language and Power, in Section 2.8.4. A better understanding of the
operational environment would in–turn lead to a better application of the instruments
of national power.
5.3.4 Portfolio of Models.
As currently developed, the only application of this methodology has been Iraq,
and as of December 2011 the operations in Iraq have come to close. While the data
for Iraq exists and is easy to locate, the true power of this model would be in the
application for a country that is on the verge of instability. A portfolio of models would
provide the availability to conduct a quick–turn analysis on a country of interest.
Additionally, this would aid in the development of the indices, be useful in countries
where data is limited, or potentially be used to conduct back of the envelope analysis
to determine an estimate before in-depth analysis can be conducted. This could be
accomplished through models based on a combination of countries, specific similar
countries, or even regional models to represent the country of interest. Planners can
then realize the impacts and plan applications of the instruments of national power to
achieve desired effects. The common baseline referred to in Section 5.3.1 is required
to achieve this.
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5.3.5 Dynamic Programming.
The application of DIME is done in stages (sequentially in discrete time), both
yearly and monthly. The outcome of the application decision is not always known,
but an estimate can be determined. The goal is to then apply DIME (an additive cost
function) in a manner which maximizes the positive change in the PMESII indices of a
nation–state. Dynamic programming is sequential decision making under uncertainty
and has two principal features, the model has an underlying discrete-time dynamic
system and a cost function which is additive over time. The dynamic system is
expressed by
xk+1 = fk(xk, uk, ωk) k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 (5.2)
where
k indexes discrete time
xk is the state of the system and summarizes past information which is relevant
for future optimization
uk is the control or decision at time k
ωk is a stochastic element or noise in the system
N is the planning horizon (may be infinite)
fk is a function that describes the system and update mechanism
The cost function gk(xk, uk, ωk) is additive over time and due to the presence of the
stochastic element the problem is formulated as the optimization of an expected cost
E
{
gN(xN) +
N−1∑
k=0
gk(xk, uk, ωk)
}
(5.3)
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In this research, the elements needed to implement this approach are available: xk
is the PMESI index at time k, uk is the application of the diME instruments, and
ωk would be an instance of the stochastic shock or noise in the systems to replicate
the true unknown element in the system. Solving this as a Dynamic Programming
problem, the goal is to obtain the optimal policy for the time horizon by optimizing
the controls over each time index [5:2-3].
5.4 Conclusion
This research provides a methodology to understand the application of the in-
struments of national power through the operational variables. This provides the
ability to conduct tradeoff analysis and wargame. The most prominent aspect of this
research is not the evaluation of the progress in Iraq specifically, but rather how the
application of the instruments of national power may be applied more effectively and
can be applied in a future time period, for a unknown country. The understanding of
the dynamics from the system can then be implemented in a strategic plan; measured,
updated, and reevaluated periodically if needed. Through an increased awareness and
deeper understanding of operational environment dynamics, the goal is to conduct
SSTRO which minimizes time, resources, and casualties, all while achieving national
strategic objectives.
98
Appendix A. Data Tables
Table 19. Data to Calculate the Political Index
Political
Time ISF Iraqi Iraqi Freedom of Displaced Elected
(month) Strength Army (Poll) Police (Poll) Press Index Persons Gov’t
Constant
1 0 0 0 37.5 44444 0
2 0 0 0 37.5 44444 0
3 8000 0 0 37.5 44444 0
4 19000 0 0 37.5 44444 0
5 30000 0 0 37.5 44444 0
6 37170 0 0 37.5 44444 0
7 44200 0 0 37.5 44444 0
8 66800 0 0 37.5 44444 0
9 94800 39 45 37.5 44444 0
10 99600 39 45 37.5 44444 0
11 108800 39 45 58.5 33333 0
12 125000 56 69 58.5 33333 0
13 134991 56 69 58.5 33333 0
14 124253 56 69 58.5 33333 0
15 135712 56 69 58.5 33333 0
16 145317 56 69 58.5 33333 0
17 95088 56 69 58.5 33333 0
18 91468 56 69 58.5 33333 0
19 98708 56 69 58.5 33333 0
20 110998 56 69 58.5 33333 0
21 113506 56 69 58.5 33333 0
22 118009 56 69 58.5 33333 0
23 125373 56 69 67 33333 0
24 141761 56 69 67 33333 0.5
25 151618 56 69 67 33333 0.5
26 159493 56 69 67 33333 0.5
27 168227 56 69 67 33333 0.5
28 168674 56 69 67 33333 0.5
29 173900 56 69 67 33333 0.5
30 182900 56 69 67 33333 0.5
31 192100 56 69 67 33333 0.5
32 211000 56 69 67 33333 0.5
33 214000 66 67 67 33333 0.5
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 19 – Continued
Political
Time ISF Iraqi Iraqi Freedom of Displaced Elected
(month) Strength Army (Poll) Police (Poll) Press Index Persons Gov’t Constant
34 223700 66 67 67 33333 0.5
35 227300 66 67 66.8 66667 0.5
36 232100 66 67 66.8 66667 1
37 250500 66 67 66.8 66667 1
38 253700 66 67 66.8 66667 1
39 265600 66 67 66.8 66667 1
40 264600 66 67 66.8 66667 1
41 269600 66 67 66.8 66667 1
42 298000 66 67 66.8 66667 1
43 307800 66 67 66.8 66667 1
44 312400 66 67 66.8 66667 1
45 323000 66 67 66.8 66667 1
46 323000 66 67 66.8 66667 1
47 323000 66 67 67.8 61667 1
48 323180 66 67 67.8 61667 1
49 329800 61 64 67.8 61667 1
50 333100 61 64 67.8 61667 1
51 348700 61 64 67.8 61667 1
52 353100 61 64 67.8 61667 1
53 359700 61 64 67.8 61667 1
54 359700 67 69 67.8 61667 1
55 359700 67 69 67.8 61667 1
56 359700 67 69 67.8 61667 1
57 429630 67 69 67.8 61667 1
58 439678 67 69 67.8 61667 1
59 441779 67 69 59.4 2500 1
60 425345 65 67 59.4 2500 1
61 444502 65 67 59.4 2500 1
62 444502 65 67 59.4 2500 1
63 478524 65 67 59.4 2500 1
64 478524 65 67 59.4 2500 1
65 513506 65 67 59.4 2500 1
66 513506 65 67 59.4 2500 1
67 531000 65 67 59.4 2500 1
68 542125 65 67 59.4 2500 1
69 558279 65 67 59.4 2500 1
70 589054 65 67 59.4 2500 1
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Table 20. Data to Calculate the Military Index
Military
Time ISF Coalition Attacks on Oil and Iraqi Multiple Casualty
(month) KIA KIA Gas Infrastructure Civilian Car/Suicide
and Personnel KIA Events
1 65 92 0 0 0
2 65 80 0 0 0
3 65 41 0 866 0
4 65 36 6 1026 0
5 65 49 2 935 1
6 65 43 5 1292 4
7 65 33 2 860 3
8 65 47 4 825 13
9 70 110 9 677 6
10 80 48 9 817 14
11 90 52 2 831 9
12 100 23 2 938 17
13 110 52 6 1190 9
14 120 140 4 2014 9
15 130 84 7 1627 9
16 140 50 12 1021 19
17 150 58 17 932 11
18 160 75 21 1517 13
19 160 87 20 1434 16
20 160 68 11 1329 17
21 160 141 30 2638 11
22 50 76 17 1333 17
23 109 127 13 1448 28
24 103 60 13 1599 18
25 176 39 10 1333 13
26 199 52 5 1200 21
27 259 88 10 1777 36
28 296 83 10 1517 34
29 304 58 9 1658 26
30 282 85 9 3303 27
31 233 52 9 1964 46
32 215 99 9 1376 39
33 176 86 0 1640 41
34 193 68 3 1348 21
35 189 64 10 1778 30
36 158 58 9 2165 39
37 191 33 15 2378 37
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 20 – Continued
Military
Time ISF Coalition Attacks on Oil and Iraqi Multiple Casualty
(month) KIA KIA Gas Infrastructure Civilian Car/Suicide
and Personnel KIA Events
38 201 82 6 2284 40
39 150 79 13 2669 56
40 132 63 8 3149 57
41 217 46 7 3590 53
42 233 66 2 3009 52
43 150 77 10 3345 57
44 224 110 4 3709 56
45 123 78 11 3462 65
46 123 115 5 2914 69
47 91 86 5 3500 44
48 150 85 8 2700 56
49 215 82 3 2400 51
50 300 117 19 2500 53
51 198 132 14 2600 42
52 197 108 14 1950 39
53 232 89 12 2350 43
54 76 88 0 2000 28
55 96 69 1 1100 30
56 114 41 1 950 34
57 89 40 1 750 22
58 72 24 1 750 23
59 69 40 1 600 24
60 110 30 2 700 21
61 161 40 1 750 28
62 113 52 0 950 21
63 110 21 0 550 14
64 77 31 0 490 19
65 98 13 0 500 19
66 85 23 0 450 22
67 98 25 0 400 22
68 48 14 0 350 14
69 27 17 0 270 24
70 74 16 0 350 23
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Table 21. Data to Calculate the Economic Index
Economic
Time Gross Domestic Consumer Foreign Direct Revenue
(month) Product in Price Index Investment from Oil
US Billions $ Change (%) US Millions $ US Millions $
1 1.13 2.83 0.00 0.00
2 1.13 2.83 0.00 0.00
3 1.13 2.83 0.00 0.00
4 1.13 2.83 0.00 0.20
5 1.13 2.83 0.00 0.36
6 1.13 2.83 0.00 0.44
7 1.13 2.83 0.00 0.73
8 1.13 2.83 0.00 0.89
9 1.13 2.83 0.00 1.21
10 1.13 2.83 0.00 1.26
11 1.22 2.67 10.00 1.26
12 1.30 2.67 10.00 1.10
13 1.39 2.67 10.00 1.61
14 1.47 2.67 10.00 1.50
15 1.55 2.67 10.00 1.36
16 1.64 2.67 10.00 1.28
17 1.72 2.67 10.00 1.40
18 1.81 2.67 10.00 1.24
19 1.89 2.67 10.00 1.75
20 1.97 2.67 10.00 1.99
21 2.06 2.67 10.00 1.25
22 2.14 2.67 10.00 1.44
23 2.20 2.67 10.00 1.49
24 2.26 2.67 10.00 1.34
25 2.33 2.67 10.00 1.99
26 2.39 2.67 10.00 1.83
27 2.45 2.67 10.00 1.57
28 2.51 2.67 10.00 2.03
29 2.57 2.67 10.00 2.47
30 2.63 2.67 10.00 2.63
31 2.69 2.67 10.00 2.74
32 2.75 2.67 10.00 1.90
33 2.81 2.67 10.00 1.67
34 2.88 2.67 10.00 1.60
35 2.97 4.17 10.00 1.84
36 3.06 4.17 10.00 2.16
37 3.14 4.17 10.00 2.25
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 21 – Continued
Economic
Time Gross Domestic Consumer Foreign Direct Revenue
(month) Product in Price Index Investment from Oil
US Billions $ Change (%) US Millions $ US Millions $
38 3.22 4.17 10.00 3.02
39 3.29 4.17 10.00 2.92
40 3.35 4.17 10.00 3.03
41 3.41 4.17 10.00 3.41
42 3.46 4.17 10.00 3.44
43 3.51 4.17 10.00 2.73
44 3.55 4.17 10.00 2.45
45 3.59 4.17 10.00 2.19
46 4.04 4.17 10.00 2.46
47 4.09 2.51 10.00 1.89
48 4.14 2.51 10.00 2.11
49 4.19 2.51 10.00 2.75
50 4.23 2.51 10.00 2.75
51 4.28 2.51 10.00 3.05
52 4.33 2.51 10.00 2.87
53 4.38 2.51 10.00 3.39
54 4.43 2.51 10.00 3.49
55 4.47 2.51 10.00 3.79
56 4.52 2.51 10.00 4.44
57 4.57 2.51 10.00 3.47
58 4.62 2.51 10.00 4.27
59 4.65 0.23 100.00 5.21
60 4.69 0.23 100.00 4.94
61 4.73 0.23 100.00 5.94
62 4.77 0.23 100.00 5.77
63 4.81 0.23 100.00 6.65
64 4.85 0.23 100.00 6.99
65 4.88 0.23 100.00 7.01
66 4.92 0.23 100.00 5.65
67 4.96 0.23 100.00 4.64
68 5.00 0.23 100.00 3.68
69 5.04 0.23 100.00 2.77
70 5.08 0.23 100.00 1.99
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Table 22. Data to Calculate the Social Index
Social
Polls: Access to Services
Time Clean Medical Fuel Number of Number of Percent of
(month) Water Care Doctors Trained School Age
Judges Children in School
1 0.35 0.50 0.51 23748 0 0.73
2 0.35 0.50 0.51 23496 0 0.72
3 0.35 0.50 0.51 23244 0 0.72
4 0.35 0.50 0.51 22993 0 0.72
5 0.35 0.50 0.51 22741 0 0.72
6 0.35 0.50 0.51 22489 0 0.72
7 0.35 0.50 0.51 22237 0 0.72
8 0.35 0.50 0.51 21985 0 0.72
9 0.35 0.50 0.51 21733 0 0.72
10 0.35 0.50 0.51 21481 0 0.72
11 0.35 0.50 0.51 21229 0 0.72
12 0.35 0.50 0.51 20978 0 0.72
13 0.35 0.50 0.52 20726 0 0.72
14 0.36 0.51 0.52 20474 0 0.72
15 0.36 0.51 0.53 20222 0 0.72
16 0.37 0.52 0.53 19970 175 0.72
17 0.37 0.52 0.54 19718 175 0.72
18 0.38 0.52 0.54 19466 175 0.72
19 0.38 0.53 0.55 19214 175 0.72
20 0.39 0.53 0.55 18963 175 0.72
21 0.39 0.53 0.56 18711 175 0.72
22 0.40 0.54 0.56 18459 175 0.72
23 0.40 0.54 0.57 18207 175 0.72
24 0.41 0.55 0.57 17955 175 0.72
25 0.41 0.55 0.58 17703 175 0.72
26 0.42 0.55 0.58 17451 175 0.72
27 0.42 0.56 0.59 17199 351 0.72
28 0.43 0.56 0.59 16948 351 0.72
29 0.43 0.56 0.60 16696 351 0.72
30 0.44 0.57 0.60 16444 351 0.72
31 0.44 0.57 0.61 16192 351 0.72
32 0.45 0.58 0.61 15940 351 0.72
33 0.45 0.58 0.62 15688 351 0.72
34 0.43 0.56 0.60 15436 351 0.72
35 0.41 0.55 0.58 15184 351 0.72
36 0.39 0.53 0.56 14933 351 0.72
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 22 – Continued
Social
Polls: Access to Services
Time Clean Medical Fuel Number of Number of Percent of
(month) Water Care Doctors Trained School Age
Judges Children in School
37 0.37 0.51 0.54 14681 351 0.71
38 0.35 0.49 0.52 14429 351 0.71
39 0.33 0.48 0.50 14177 700 0.71
40 0.31 0.46 0.48 13925 700 0.71
41 0.29 0.44 0.47 13673 700 0.71
42 0.26 0.42 0.45 13421 740 0.71
43 0.24 0.41 0.43 13169 740 0.71
44 0.22 0.39 0.41 12918 740 0.71
45 0.20 0.37 0.39 12666 800 0.71
46 0.18 0.35 0.37 12414 800 0.71
47 0.16 0.34 0.35 12396 870 0.71
48 0.14 0.32 0.33 12378 870 0.71
49 0.12 0.30 0.31 12360 870 0.71
50 0.11 0.29 0.31 12343 870 0.71
51 0.10 0.28 0.32 12325 870 0.71
52 0.10 0.27 0.32 12307 870 0.71
53 0.09 0.26 0.33 12289 870 0.71
54 0.08 0.25 0.33 12271 1100 0.71
55 0.09 0.26 0.34 12253 1100 0.71
56 0.09 0.27 0.35 12236 1100 0.71
57 0.10 0.28 0.36 12218 1200 0.71
58 0.11 0.29 0.36 12200 1200 0.71
59 0.11 0.30 0.37 12433 1200 0.71
60 0.12 0.31 0.38 12667 1200 0.71
61 0.14 0.32 0.38 12900 1200 0.71
62 0.16 0.32 0.38 13133 1200 0.71
63 0.19 0.33 0.39 13367 1200 0.71
64 0.21 0.33 0.39 13600 1180 0.71
65 0.23 0.34 0.39 13833 1180 0.71
66 0.25 0.35 0.39 14067 1180 0.71
67 0.27 0.35 0.39 14300 1180 0.71
68 0.29 0.36 0.39 14533 1180 0.70
69 0.32 0.36 0.40 14767 1180 0.70
70 0.34 0.37 0.40 15000 1225 0.70
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Table 23. Data to Calculate the Infrastructure Index
Infrastructure
Time Monthly Telephone Average Hours Monthly Internet
(month) Subscribers of Electricity Subscribers
1 833000 0.00 4500
2 733000 0.00 4557
3 683000 0.00 4614
4 633000 4.00 4671
5 6000000 4.00 4729
6 600000 5.13 4786
7 600000 6.25 4843
8 600000 7.38 4900
9 600000 8.50 11038
10 600000 9.63 17175
11 600000 10.75 23313
12 600000 11.88 29450
13 900000 13.00 35588
14 984225 16.00 41725
15 1095000 15.00 47863
16 1220000 11.00 54000
17 1200000 10.00 59000
18 1331574 10.00 73000
19 1463148 1.00 87000
20 1579457 13.00 95000
21 1753000 13.00 102978
22 2135000 13.00 110000
23 2152000 11.00 117147
24 2449139 9.00 124293
25 2569110 8.50 135685
26 2982115 11.80 147076
27 3172771 9.00 151839
28 3450000 8.40 156603
29 3801822 9.40 161366
30 4100000 12.60 166130
31 4590398 12.00 170893
32 4911320 13.50 175656
33 5232243 14.30 180420
34 5553165 13.30 185183
35 5874087 12.00 189946
36 6195009 9.80 194710
37 6515932 10.30 199473
38 6836854 13.10 204237
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 23 – Continued
Infrastructure
Time Monthly Telephone Average Hours Monthly Internet
(month) Subscribers of Electricity Subscribers
39 7400000 10.90 209000
40 7575000 9.90 206078
41 7750000 11.94 203155
42 7925000 11.42 200233
43 8100000 10.87 197310
44 8200000 10.80 196347
45 8200000 12.30 195704
46 8500000 10.90 194420
47 9800000 9.20 212210
48 9800000 8.00 230000
49 9810000 9.30 240333
50 9820000 10.90 250667
51 9830000 11.60 261000
52 10117500 10.10 355417
53 10405000 10.60 449833
54 10692500 10.40 544250
55 10980000 10.30 638667
56 11267500 11.80 733083
57 11555000 12.90 827500
58 11842500 12.30 818227
59 12130000 11.70 808955
60 12417500 8.70 799682
61 12705000 8.70 790409
62 12992500 8.40 781137
63 13280000 8.00 771864
64 13450000 7.60 762591
65 13620000 10.90 753319
66 13790000 11.30 744046
67 13960000 10.80 734773
68 14130000 8.70 725501
69 14300000 13.40 716228
70 14900000 11.20 706955
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Table 24. Military and Economic Inputs (diME)
diME Inputs
Time Military Economic
(month) #Troops US Billions $
1 0.00 0.4286
2 1.50 0.4286
3 1.50 0.4286
4 1.49 0.4286
5 1.39 0.4286
6 1.32 0.4286
7 1.31 0.4286
8 1.23 1.6250
9 1.22 1.6250
10 1.22 1.6250
11 1.15 1.6250
12 1.30 1.6250
13 1.37 1.6250
14 1.38 1.6250
15 1.38 1.6250
16 1.40 1.6250
17 1.40 1.6250
18 1.38 1.6250
19 1.38 1.6250
20 1.38 0.1667
21 1.48 0.1667
22 1.50 0.1667
23 1.55 0.1667
24 1.50 0.1667
25 1.42 0.1667
26 1.38 0.1667
27 1.35 0.1667
28 1.38 0.1667
29 1.38 0.1667
30 1.38 0.1667
31 1.52 0.1667
32 1.60 0.2667
33 1.60 0.2667
34 1.36 0.2667
35 1.33 0.2667
36 1.33 0.2667
37 1.32 0.2667
38 1.32 0.2667
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 24 – Continued
diME Inputs
Time Military Economic
(month) # Troops US Billions $
39 1.27 0.2667
40 1.30 0.2667
41 1.38 0.2667
42 1.44 0.2667
43 1.44 0.2667
44 1.40 0.2667
45 1.40 0.2667
46 1.32 0.2667
47 1.35 0.2667
48 1.42 0.2667
49 1.46 0.2667
50 1.50 0.2667
51 1.57 0.2667
52 1.60 0.2667
53 1.62 0.2667
54 1.68 0.2667
55 1.71 0.2667
56 1.62 0.2250
57 1.60 0.2250
58 1.57 0.2250
59 1.57 0.2250
60 1.55 0.2250
61 1.53 0.2250
62 1.50 0.2250
63 1.48 0.2250
64 1.48 0.2250
65 1.48 0.2250
66 1.48 0.2250
67 1.48 0.2250
68 1.48 0.1833
69 1.45 0.1833
70 1.42 0.1833
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Appendix B. Regression and Coefficient Tables
Table 25. Table of Regression Coefficients
Political
β1 0.00000011844073546663800
β2 -0.00002250086842663090000
β3 0.00133143041495831000000
β4 -0.01466377441557400000000
β5 0.28469247737427800000000
Military
β1 -0.00000024547253720522900
β2 0.00004055754475489060000
β3 -0.00176755522389604000000
β4 0.01024206711313980000000
β5 0.82902520191780100000000
Economic
β1 -0.00000024547487951500600
β2 0.00004199360863928890000
β3 -0.00211451002742180000000
β4 0.04034090075512610000000
β5 0.00418144507801799000000
Social
β1 0.00000006843872139960920
β2 -0.00000820453113023478000
β3 0.00032188358380080800000
β4 -0.00375731840927074000000
β5 0.46888394672716100000000
Infrastructure
β1 -0.00000011837715959962800
β2 0.00001742272861532740000
β3 -0.00085108685547952100000
β4 0.02008144509396460000000
β5 0.01251049720667650000000
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Table 26. Table of Derivative Coefficients
Political
c1 0.0000004737629418665520
c2 -0.0000675026052798927000
c3 0.0026628608299166200000
c4 -0.0146637744155740000000
Military
c1 -0.0000009818901488209160
c2 0.0001216726342646720000
c3 -0.0035351104477920800000
c4 0.0102420671131398000000
Economic
c1 -0.0000009818995180600240
c2 0.0001259808259178670000
c3 -0.0042290200548436000000
c4 0.0403409007551261000000
Social
c1 0.0000002737548855984370
c2 -0.0000246135933907043000
c3 0.0006437671676016160000
c4 -0.0037573184092707400000
Infrastructure
c1 -0.0000004735086383985120
c2 0.0000522681858459822000
c3 -0.0017021737109590400000
c4 0.0200814450939646000000
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Table 27. a Coefficients (full precision)
i j = 1
1 -0.01083501615326630000
2 0.07431361157128300000
3 0.02874407545100780000
4 -0.00054775677185041400
5 0.00346700297334305000
i j = 3
1 -0.02005569187569890000
2 0.01688088305261940000
3 0.01552892230140780000
4 0.00010964415239150800
5 0.00082537241058253200
i j = 3
1 0.00002031568921243150
2 0.00021608926013287400
3 -0.00086319629349991100
4 0.00043050900543419400
5 -0.00101436755553736000
i j = 4
1 0.00400525576986245000
2 -0.01018366931286610000
3 -0.01004271724607080000
4 0.02461020169169960000
5 -0.02647687739702560000
i j = 5
1 0.00356203566192572000
2 -0.02414472846748650000
3 -0.01567071616639290000
4 0.00213555037894761000
5 -0.00548575949780422000
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Table 28. b Coefficients (full precision)
i j = 1
1 0.398015141750026000
2 0.909401079911930000
3 0.443913560641917000
4 0.178810101884673000
5 0.238762358092223000
i j = 2
1 0.631945615708440000
2 0.502615618698794000
3 0.360670421790453000
4 0.078165558991190800
5 0.076900990198610300
i j = 3
1 0.006152639745050480
2 0.523495025889631000
3 0.187323699465370000
4 0.070070513180899000
5 0.134208115831946000
i j = 4
1 0.089412319856625600
2 0.144362348198396000
3 0.109325323093760000
4 0.434394881937596000
5 0.347975417823036000
i j = 5
1 0.101094797180729000
2 0.648145314969934000
3 0.308491646319828000
4 0.296060693010735000
5 0.260304480244896000
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Table 29. d Coefficients (full precision)
i k = 1 k = 2
1 -0.0074938163170398700 -0.0008034283214846400
2 0.0230729470057021000 0.0007235929449071280
3 0.0184395682832470000 0.0007634774704140440
4 -0.0017063445940387500 0.0008384700491929670
5 0.0049510481717654300 -0.0005527356198253540
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Appendix C. PMESI Index Values
Table 30. Normalized Index Values
Normalized Index Values
Time Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
1 0.2401 0.8800 0.1327 0.4696 0.0108
2 0.2403 0.8894 0.1327 0.4671 0.0100
3 0.2405 0.8683 0.1327 0.4645 0.0648
4 0.2407 0.8404 0.1398 0.4620 0.1376
5 0.2408 0.8456 0.1455 0.4595 0.0799
6 0.2409 0.8033 0.1484 0.4577 0.0955
7 0.2410 0.8530 0.1587 0.4559 0.1112
8 0.2410 0.7884 0.1644 0.4540 0.1276
9 0.2944 0.7593 0.1758 0.4522 0.1440
10 0.2970 0.7538 0.1776 0.4503 0.1604
11 0.2745 0.7926 0.2165 0.4485 0.1769
12 0.3176 0.7631 0.2147 0.4467 0.1973
13 0.3257 0.7416 0.2368 0.4460 0.2408
14 0.3167 0.6230 0.2368 0.4453 0.2292
15 0.3260 0.6719 0.2357 0.4446 0.1761
16 0.3337 0.6609 0.2367 0.4731 0.1625
17 0.2922 0.6727 0.2449 0.4724 0.1661
18 0.2891 0.5925 0.2431 0.4716 0.0446
19 0.2949 0.5772 0.2652 0.4709 0.2137
20 0.3048 0.6270 0.2777 0.4701 0.2170
21 0.3067 0.4496 0.2552 0.4694 0.2228
22 0.3102 0.6786 0.2659 0.4686 0.0433
23 0.3018 0.5501 0.2705 0.4693 0.1730
24 0.4816 0.6465 0.2680 0.4686 0.1690
25 0.4894 0.6609 0.2940 0.4678 0.2215
26 0.4955 0.6217 0.2911 0.4670 0.1856
27 0.5023 0.4239 0.2847 0.4955 0.1813
28 0.5024 0.4260 0.3039 0.4948 0.2001
29 0.5063 0.4738 0.3225 0.4940 0.2489
30 0.5132 0.3652 0.3310 0.4931 0.2472
31 0.5202 0.4155 0.3378 0.4923 0.2725
32 0.5349 0.4607 0.3107 0.4914 0.2881
33 0.5478 0.5073 0.3053 0.4906 0.2787
34 0.5555 0.6120 0.3056 0.4838 0.2651
35 0.5374 0.5229 0.2287 0.4770 0.2389
36 0.7077 0.4873 0.2443 0.4703 0.2502
37 0.7227 0.4576 0.2513 0.4635 0.2935
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 30 – Continued
Normalized Index Values
Time Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure
38 0.7250 0.4361 0.2822 0.4567 0.2703
39 0.7344 0.3495 0.2818 0.5081 0.2579
40 0.7332 0.3602 0.2887 0.5013 0.2878
41 0.7369 0.3081 0.3049 0.4945 0.2821
42 0.7599 0.3388 0.3084 0.4945 0.2760
43 0.7675 0.3169 0.2854 0.4878 0.2759
44 0.7709 0.2420 0.2775 0.4810 0.2963
45 0.7791 0.2864 0.2701 0.4843 0.2802
46 0.7786 0.2930 0.3005 0.4776 0.2745
47 0.7795 0.4249 0.3819 0.4843 0.2597
48 0.7792 0.3614 0.3920 0.4793 0.2788
49 0.7680 0.3769 0.4170 0.4666 0.3021
50 0.7700 0.2123 0.4193 0.4650 0.3129
51 0.7814 0.3407 0.4322 0.4634 0.3067
52 0.7843 0.4138 0.4280 0.4618 0.3283
53 0.7888 0.3673 0.4488 0.4603 0.3400
54 0.8122 0.6200 0.4546 0.4970 0.3531
55 0.8117 0.6609 0.4675 0.4995 0.3884
56 0.8111 0.6595 0.4929 0.5020 0.4180
57 0.8499 0.7485 0.4605 0.5212 0.4115
58 0.8500 0.7687 0.4913 0.5237 0.4050
59 0.8995 0.7624 0.8886 0.5281 0.3652
60 0.8995 0.7452 0.8807 0.5324 0.3670
61 0.8995 0.6669 0.9182 0.5384 0.3646
62 0.8995 0.7181 0.9139 0.5444 0.3609
63 0.8995 0.8025 0.9470 0.5505 0.3557
64 0.8995 0.7981 0.9609 0.5532 0.4019
65 0.8995 0.7964 0.9634 0.5592 0.4079
66 0.8995 0.7865 0.9167 0.5652 0.4013
67 0.8995 0.7784 0.8825 0.5712 0.3726
68 0.8995 0.8653 0.8500 0.5772 0.4382
69 0.8995 0.8347 0.8193 0.5833 0.4131
70 0.8995 0.8012 0.7933 0.5968 0.3394
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Appendix D. Alternate diME Figures
Table 31. Alternate diME Figures
Alternate diME Figures
Time No Surge Withdrawal Early Surge Even-Spending
1 0.00 0.4286 0.00 0.4286 0.00 0.4286 0.00 0.4019
2 1.50 0.4286 1.50 0.4286 1.50 0.4286 1.50 0.4019
3 1.50 0.4286 1.50 0.4286 1.50 0.4286 1.50 0.4019
4 1.49 0.4286 1.49 0.4286 1.49 0.4286 1.49 0.4019
5 1.39 0.4286 1.39 0.4286 1.39 0.4286 1.39 0.4019
6 1.32 0.4286 1.32 0.4286 1.32 0.4286 1.32 0.4019
7 1.31 0.4286 1.31 0.4286 1.31 0.4286 1.31 0.4019
8 1.23 1.6250 1.23 1.6250 1.23 1.6250 1.23 0.4019
9 1.22 1.6250 1.22 1.6250 1.22 1.6250 1.22 0.4019
10 1.22 1.6250 1.22 1.6250 1.22 1.6250 1.22 0.4019
11 1.15 1.6250 1.15 1.6250 1.15 1.6250 1.15 0.4019
12 1.30 1.6250 1.30 1.6250 1.30 1.6250 1.30 0.4019
13 1.37 1.6250 1.37 1.6250 1.37 1.6250 1.37 0.4019
14 1.38 1.6250 1.38 1.6250 1.38 1.6250 1.38 0.4019
15 1.38 1.6250 1.38 1.6250 1.38 1.6250 1.38 0.4019
16 1.40 1.6250 1.40 1.6250 1.40 1.6250 1.40 0.4019
17 1.40 1.6250 1.40 1.6250 1.40 1.6250 1.40 0.4019
18 1.38 1.6250 1.38 1.6250 1.38 1.6250 1.38 0.4019
19 1.38 1.6250 1.38 1.6250 1.38 1.6250 1.38 0.4019
20 1.38 0.1667 1.38 0.1667 1.38 0.1667 1.38 0.4019
21 1.48 0.1667 1.48 0.1667 1.48 0.1667 1.48 0.4019
22 1.50 0.1667 1.50 0.1667 1.48 0.1667 1.50 0.4019
23 1.55 0.1667 1.55 0.1667 1.48 0.1667 1.55 0.4019
24 1.50 0.1667 1.50 0.1667 1.48 0.1667 1.50 0.4019
25 1.42 0.1667 1.42 0.1667 1.50 0.1667 1.42 0.4019
26 1.38 0.1667 1.38 0.1667 1.57 0.1667 1.38 0.4019
27 1.35 0.1667 1.35 0.1667 1.60 0.1667 1.35 0.4019
28 1.38 0.1667 1.38 0.1667 1.62 0.1667 1.38 0.4019
29 1.38 0.1667 1.38 0.1667 1.68 0.1667 1.38 0.4019
30 1.38 0.1667 1.38 0.1667 1.71 0.1667 1.38 0.4019
31 1.52 0.1667 1.52 0.1667 1.62 0.1667 1.52 0.4019
32 1.60 0.2667 1.60 0.2667 1.60 0.2667 1.60 0.4019
33 1.60 0.2667 1.60 0.2667 1.57 0.2667 1.60 0.4019
34 1.36 0.2667 1.36 0.2667 1.57 0.2667 1.36 0.4019
35 1.33 0.2667 1.33 0.2667 1.55 0.2667 1.33 0.4019
36 1.33 0.2667 1.33 0.2667 1.53 0.2667 1.33 0.4019
37 1.32 0.2667 1.32 0.2667 1.50 0.2667 1.32 0.4019
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 31 – Continued
Alternate diME Figures
Time No Surge Withdrawal Early Surge Even-Spending
38 1.32 0.2667 1.32 0.2667 1.48 0.2667 1.32 0.4019
39 1.32 0.2667 1.27 0.2667 1.48 0.2667 1.27 0.4019
40 1.32 0.2667 1.30 0.2667 1.48 0.2667 1.30 0.4019
41 1.32 0.2667 1.38 0.2667 1.48 0.2667 1.38 0.4019
42 1.32 0.2667 1.44 0.2667 1.48 0.2667 1.44 0.4019
43 1.32 0.2667 1.44 0.2667 1.48 0.2667 1.44 0.4019
44 1.32 0.2667 1.40 0.2667 1.45 0.2667 1.40 0.4019
45 1.32 0.2667 1.40 0.2667 1.42 0.2667 1.40 0.4019
46 1.32 0.2667 1.32 0.2667 1.40 0.2667 1.32 0.4019
47 1.32 0.2667 1.35 0.2667 1.50 0.2667 1.35 0.4019
48 1.32 0.2667 1.42 0.2667 1.55 0.2667 1.42 0.4019
49 1.32 0.2667 1.46 0.2667 1.50 0.2667 1.46 0.4019
50 1.32 0.2667 1.35 0.2667 1.42 0.2667 1.50 0.4019
51 1.32 0.2667 1.24 0.2667 1.38 0.2667 1.57 0.4019
52 1.32 0.2667 1.12 0.2667 1.35 0.2667 1.60 0.4019
53 1.32 0.2667 1.01 0.2667 1.38 0.2667 1.62 0.4019
54 1.32 0.2667 0.90 0.2667 1.38 0.2667 1.68 0.4019
55 1.32 0.2667 0.79 0.2667 1.38 0.2667 1.71 0.4019
56 1.32 0.2250 0.67 0.2250 1.52 0.2250 1.62 0.4019
57 1.32 0.2250 0.56 0.2250 1.60 0.2250 1.60 0.4019
58 1.32 0.2250 0.45 0.2250 1.60 0.2250 1.57 0.4019
59 1.32 0.2250 0.34 0.2250 1.36 0.2250 1.57 0.4019
60 1.32 0.2250 0.22 0.2250 1.33 0.2250 1.55 0.4019
61 1.32 0.2250 0.11 0.2250 1.33 0.2250 1.53 0.4019
62 1.32 0.2250 0.00 0.2250 1.32 0.2250 1.50 0.4019
63 1.32 0.2250 0.00 0.2250 1.32 0.2250 1.48 0.4019
64 1.32 0.2250 0.00 0.2250 1.27 0.2250 1.48 0.4019
65 1.32 0.2250 0.00 0.2250 1.30 0.2250 1.48 0.4019
66 1.32 0.2250 0.00 0.2250 1.38 0.2250 1.48 0.4019
67 1.32 0.2250 0.00 0.2250 1.44 0.2250 1.48 0.4019
68 1.32 0.1833 0.00 0.1833 1.44 0.1833 1.48 0.4019
69 1.32 0.1833 0.00 0.1833 1.40 0.1833 1.45 0.4019
70 1.32 0.1833 0.00 0.1833 1.40 0.1833 1.42 0.4019
119
Appendix E. Quad Chart
The Quad Chart for this research is found below.
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